Education and income inequality:  an empirical analysis for the Slovak Republic by Pellegrini , Thea
 
 
UNIVERSITA’ DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA 
 
DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE ECONOMICHE ED AZIENDALI 
“M.FANNO” 
 
 
CORSO DI LAUREA MAGISTRALE IN  
ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TESI DI LAUREA 
 
 
“EDUCATION AND INCOME INEQUALITY: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS FOR THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC” 
 
 
 
 
 
RELATORE: 
 
CH.MO PROF. THOMAS BASSETTI 
 
 
 
 
 
LAUREANDA: THEA PELLEGRINI 
 
MATRICOLA N. 1104272 
 
 
 
ANNO ACCADEMICO 2016 – 2017 
 
2 
 
  
3 
 
Il candidato dichiara che il presente lavoro è originale e non è già stato sottoposto, in tutto o in 
parte, per il conseguimento di un titolo accademico in altre Università italiane o straniere.  
Il candidato dichiara altresì che tutti i materiali utilizzati durante la preparazione 
dell’elaborato sono stati indicati nel testo e nella sezione “Riferimenti bibliografici” e che le 
eventuali citazioni testuali sono individuabili attraverso l’esplicito richiamo alla pubblicazione 
originale. 
 
Firma dello studente 
 
_________________ 
 
 
  
4 
 
 
 
  
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ringrazio il Professor Thomas Bassetti per avermi seguito nel mio lavoro. 
Ringrazio la mia famiglia per il continuo sostegno e grande aiuto che mi 
hanno dato in questi anni. 
Ringrazio le mie amiche che hanno condiviso con me gioie e sacrifici. 
6 
 
  
7 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 9 
 
CHAPTER 1 – EDUCATION AND INCOME INEQUALITY:            
INTRODUCTORY NOTIONS ............................................................................................. 11 
1.1  New measures of economic performance ............................................................................. 11 
1.2  Measures of living standards ................................................................................................ 12 
1.3  Income inequality ................................................................................................................. 13 
1.4  Inequality trends in the European Union .............................................................................. 18 
1.5 Education.............................................................................................................................. 21 
1.6  Trends in education in the European Union .......................................................................... 22 
 
CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW............................................................................ 29 
2.1 Theoretical Literature ........................................................................................................... 29 
2.2 Empirical Literature.............................................................................................................. 37 
 
CHAPTER 3 – ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK ............................................................ 43 
3.1  The Higher Education Act .................................................................................................... 43 
3.2  Data ...................................................................................................................................... 48 
3.2.1  Dependent Variable ...................................................................................................... 49 
3.2.2  Independent Variables .................................................................................................. 50 
3.2.3  Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................................... 53 
3.3  Linear Regressions ............................................................................................................... 54 
3.4  The Synthetic Control Method ............................................................................................. 55 
3.5  The synth runner Package..................................................................................................... 59 
 
8 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 – EMPIRICAL RESULTS ............................................................................. 61 
4.1  Traditional Panel Regressions ..............................................................................................61 
4.2  The Synthetic Control Method .............................................................................................64 
4.3  Inference ...............................................................................................................................66 
 
CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................... 71 
 
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 73 
 
 
  
9 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the effect of education on income inequalities by 
analysing the impact of the Slovakian “Law No. 131/2002 on Higher Education and on 
Changes and Supplements to Some Laws” (hereinafter referred to as “Higher Education Act” 
or “Act”) on the market Gini coefficient.  
According to Galor and Zeira (1993), the level of growth of a country is affected by the 
amount of wealth inherited by individuals. Large amounts of wealth enable individual to 
invest in human capital and, accordingly, to contribute to the development of their society. 
Individuals with low initial wealth have difficulties accessing education. Therefore, children 
from low-income families will become unskilled workers, whereas high-income families, 
which can invest in their children’s education, will raise educated workers. Hence, earnings 
are correlated across generations. The government can deal with this issue by subsidizing 
education through a tax levied on skilled workers in the following period. In such a way, 
families will have lower costs of education, educated workers will increase and the country 
will experience sustainable growth patterns. As reported by Borck and Wimbersky (2014), 
student numbers can be increased using traditional tax subsidies. Specifically, these kinds of 
social support raise the utility of studying, lower top incomes and boost wages of low-income 
individuals. Therefore, governments can adopt these financing schemes to reduce income 
inequality.  
The Higher Education Act has been approved by the Slovak Republic on February 21st, 2002 
but came into force on April 1st, 2002. This Act changed the rules governing higher education 
financing starting from the academic year 2002/2003. Public universities were transformed 
from State budgetary organizations to public higher education institutions with non-profit 
characteristics. Thus, institutions can now keep their revenues, own their assets, and are free 
to utilise the government’s subsidy as they see fit. The subsidy is based on both inputs and 
outputs reflecting factors such as the number of students and graduates, and the number of 
publications. In this way, universities are incentivised to improve their performances. 
Reforming the higher education system, the Slovakian government sharply increased the 
amount of funds paid for student’s social support. In fact, from 2001 to 2003 social 
scholarships increased by more than 400 percent, going from 37 056 thousand SKK (1.230 
million EUR) in 2001 to 108 805 thousand SKK in 2002 (3.612 million EUR), and 201 018 
thousand SKK (6.673 million EUR) in 2003.  
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The effect of the Higher Education Reform on income inequality in Slovakia is measured 
using the Gini coefficient of market income inequality. This analysis exploits data from 1995 
to 2012. First, traditional panel regressions are estimated, then the impact of the Act is 
assessed adopting the synthetic control method. The first approach uses three estimation 
techniques: ordinary least squares, random effects, and fixed effects. Interestingly, results 
show that government expenditure positively affects market income inequality using panel 
estimation techniques. Furthermore, services have an ambiguous effect on market income 
inequality. It yields positive and negative statistically significant coefficients in the first two 
specifications, while it is not significant when using fixed effects. Then, the synthetic control 
method is used to estimate the effect of the reform on market income inequality. The synthetic 
Slovakia is built using data from four countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, and 
Germany. Results confirm the initial hypothesis and show that the Act successfully decreased 
market income inequality in the country by approximately 9 percent.  
This work proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 presents preliminary considerations on income 
inequality and education. It explains the need for these two measures and shows the situation 
in the European Union. Chapter 2 reports the existing literature on this topic, dividing 
theoretical and empirical literature. Chapter 3 provides the econometric framework by 
explaining the Higher Education Act in details, the data, and the two approaches. Finally, 
Chapter 4 describes the results obtained from the empirical analysis.  
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CHAPTER 1 – EDUCATION AND INCOME INEQUALITY: 
INTRODUCTORY NOTIONS 
 
1.1  New measures of economic performance  
Statistical indicators are important tools for assessing the impact of policies. Thus, policy 
makers aiming at improving the living conditions of societies use these data in order to 
understand the effectiveness of reforms. However, standard measures of socioeconomic 
variables, such as economic growth and inflation, seem to be distant from the actual 
perceptions of the population. There are many debates about what are the appropriate 
concepts to use in order to measure these socio-economic phenomena. In fact, large changes 
in the income distribution are not captured by the common per capita aggregates. 
Considerable increases in inequality relative to the average per capita GDP may worsen most 
people’s living conditions even though average income has risen. Therefore, these commonly 
used statistics are not appropriate when the aim is to measure the increase in the wellbeing of 
citizens.  
In 2008, the French President Nicholas Sarkozy created the Commission on the Measurement 
of Economic Performance and Social Progress led by Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (2009). The 
government was unsatisfied with the current statistical information regarding the economy 
and the society and wanted to produce more relevant indicators of social progress. The 
Commission prepared a Report identifying the limits of GDP and defining new measures of 
economic performance focusing on people’s well-being rather than on economic production. 
The authors identified eight key dimensions: 
1) Material living standards;  
2) Health; 
3) Education; 
4) Personal activities; 
5) Politics and governance; 
6) Social connections and relationships; 
7) Present and future conditions; 
8) Economical and physical uncertainty. 
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The report is addressed to four distinct groups. First of all, political leaders should emphasize 
these measures when considering new political directions. Then, these new measures are 
useful for policy-makers which aim at assessing the effectiveness of wellbeing-enhancing 
policies. Thirdly, the academic community and statisticians will become more cautious using 
certain statistics and will hopefully develop new indicators based on the author’s suggestions. 
Finally, the Report addresses users and producers of statistics, and more generally the public 
at large, which will hopefully better understand the available statistical indicators and will be 
able to make better evaluations of the issues emerging in their societies.  
 
1.2  Measures of living standards 
This section follows the classical GDP issues of the Report by Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 
(2009). 
Economic activity is mostly evaluated using GDP. Though it is mainly a market production 
measure, this quantity has been broadly used to assess the economic wellbeing of citizens. 
Confounding GDP with wellbeing can yield misleading indications about people’s 
contentment and bring about wrong policy decisions. Therefore, in order to capture material 
living standards, measures of consumption and real income are more suitable.  
Income and consumption may also be coupled with information on wealth. This measure is 
obtained by looking at the financial status of an economy. Such a report can be constructed 
using information on its assets (such as physical, natural, human and social capital) and on its 
liabilities (as the amounts owed to other countries). Therefore, the performance of an 
economy can be assessed also considering the amount of resources which are carried over into 
the future.  
Average income measures must be accompanied by distributional information in order to 
evaluate living conditions.  The distribution of income can be simply assessed by looking at 
median values. The median individual is considered as the “typical” individual, therefore 
examining the gap between the median and the mean person will yield a measure of income 
inequality in the population.  
Hence, the distribution of income is a meaningful statistic to evaluate changes in socio-
economic conditions of populations. However, there have been changes in how societies 
function. In the past, people received many services from other family members, whereas now 
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these are purchased on the market. Another important feature of economic activity comprises 
the services auto-produced by households which are not recognized in official production 
measures. National accounts do not record these economical aspects and therefore, do not 
reflect the actual living conditions of the population. Thus, this problem can be dealt with by 
broadening income measures including both market and non-market activities. Nonetheless, 
focusing on non-market activities reveals the importance of leisure activities. Living standards 
are improved if one sees a reduction in its working hours, but the individual will continue to 
consume the same amount of goods and services. Therefore, living standards are better 
evaluated taking into account leisure activities. 
Nonetheless, running cross-country comparisons of living standards is problematic when 
considering leisure. Typically, a society with a given real income and more leisure will have 
higher living standards than one with the same level of income but more leisure. Leisure is 
measured considering its relative enjoyment between groups, and its relative occurrence. 
Therefore, country’s societal regulations and union bargaining which impact relative 
enjoyment and occurrence of leisure make leisure inappropriate when one wants to compare 
citizen’s well-being across countries.  
 
1.3  Income inequality   
Income is considered as a proxy for wellbeing, therefore we analyse its distribution if we are 
interested in the population’s contentment. The economic literature has put much focus on 
income inequality. One reason is that it may be related to economic growth, to the existence 
of cyclical movements and to aggregate consumption. A second reason for measuring 
inequality is a normative motivation. The distribution of income is a social concern 
independently of its impact on other variables, therefore it is important to estimate it in order 
to guide policies. (Decancq et. al, 2015).  
There exist many measures to reflect the distribution of income. One of the most immediate 
ones is the difference between the average and median values of the distribution. Other 
standard measures of income inequality include: the Lorenz curve, the Gini coefficient, the 
Theil index and the Atkinson index. Furthermore, another common approach to measuring 
income inequality is the income quantile share ratio which divides the population into 
quantiles and then looks at the share of resources in each group over time. Some studies, such 
as that by Yitzhaki (1979), use combined measures of income inequality by calculating the 
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product of the Gini coefficient and the mean income in order to reflect the concept of relative 
deprivation (Stiglitz et al., 2009).  
The World Bank (2005) defines a set of six criteria that must be satisfied in order to get a 
good measure of income inequality: 
1) Mean independence: the measure must not change if incomes double. 
2) Population size independence: the measure must not change with the population. 
3) Symmetry: if incomes are switched the measure must not change. 
4) Pigou-Dalton Transfer sensitivity: this criterion states that when income is transferred 
from the rich to the poor the measure of inequality must decline.  
5) Decomposability: according to this principle, the inequality measure may be broken in 
different dimensions such as population groups or sources of income. 
6) Statistical testability: it should be possible to test whether the changes in the index are 
significant over time.  
The Lorenz curve is a graphical representation of income inequality. In order to plot its 
trajectory, the population must be ordered according to the size of their incomes. Then, the 
curve is drawn by considering the percentage of total income which is earned by the different 
fractions of the population (Gastwirth, 1971). The Lorenz curve is used to estimate both the 
size of the distribution of income and inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient. Each 
point (x, y) on the curve indicate that y percent of the income in the country goes to the first x 
percent of the population. Therefore, the Lorenz curve lies below the 45-degree line and it 
intersects it at 0 and 1. However, one of its important drawbacks is that the curve is 
considered as lacking of satisfactory fit over the range of the income distribution (Sylwester, 
2002; Heshmati, 2004).  
The Gini coefficient is the most used index of income inequality. It is a good measure to 
acquire information on the variations in income inequalities because it is based on people’s 
income levels. This index defines the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree 
perfect equality line. Therefore, if the Lorenz curve rests upon the 45-degree line, there is no 
space between the two curves meaning that there is perfect income equality. On the other 
hand, as the two curves move away from one another, the Gini coefficient increases. A Gini 
index of 1 indicates that all income is held by one individual and it is denoted perfect income 
inequality. Formally this measure of income inequality is expressed using the following 
formula: 
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𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 1 − ∑(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖−1)(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖−1)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (1.1) 
where 𝑥𝑖 is the cumulative percentage of population and 𝑦𝑖 is the cumulative percentage of 
income in the society.  
The main advantage of this measure is its widespread use, which is explained by the 
availability of the data. A second benefit is that it is strongly correlated with other income 
inequality measures. However, a limitation of this index is that the same Gini coefficient can 
be derived by different Lorenz curves. Hence, a small change of value does not necessarily 
mean that there has only been an irrelevant change in the distribution of income (Sylwester, 
2002).  
According to the World Bank (2005) criteria, the Gini coefficient is not an entirely 
satisfactory criterion because it does not satisfy the decomposability and statistical testability 
principles. In fact, the total Gini of a population does not correspond to the sum of all the Gini 
coefficients of the subgroups. Furthermore, the statistical testability problem may be eluded 
by using bootstrap techniques to generate confidence intervals.  
Figure 1.1 shows the Lorenz curve for global income in 2008. The cumulative percentage of 
households are represented on the horizontal axis while the vertical axis denotes the 
cumulative percentage of income. As explained above, the diagonal line indicates perfect 
equality and the underlying orange line is the Lorenz curve. Therefore, the Gini coefficient is 
calculated using the following formula:  
𝐴
𝐴+𝐵
 where areas A and B are shown in the graph. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The Lorenz curve for global income distribution in 2008 
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As mentioned above, in order to plot the Lorenz curve, the population must be ordered by 
level of income. The figure shows that in 2008, the first two-thirds of the world’s population 
received 12 percent of the world’s income. In fact, the majority of income was held by the 
upper one-fifth of the population, which detained about 80 percent of the global income. 
Furthermore, the top 1 percent of the population received almost 15 percent of the world’s 
income. Hence, in 2008 the distribution of income was quite unequal. Nowadays, the upper 
third of the population keeps rising amounts of income while the level of income of the 
world’s poorest 5 percent continues to stagnate (Milanovic, 2013).  
A measure of income inequality that satisfies all six World Bank criteria is the Theil (1967) 
statistic. It is part of a class of inequality measures which have significant consequences for 
policy makers and are knows as Generalised Entropy measures. The values of this index can 
vary between 0 and ∞, where zero represents an equal distribution and greater values 
represent higher income inequality. The main advantage of this class of measures is that they 
are decomposable, therefore within-group and between-group inequality can be estimated. A 
second advantage of this group is that researchers can assign a weight parameter α to the 
distances between incomes of the distribution. Commonly, α is equal to 0, 1 or 2. Lower 
values of α indicate that the Generalised Entropy measure is more sensitive to variations in 
the lower part of the income distribution, whereas higher values of α are defined when the 
measure is more sensitive to changes in the upper tail. For α = 0 the index is denoted as the 
“Theil L” measure. Then, when α = 1 the index is defined as the “Theil T” or, commonly, the 
“Theil index”. Lastly, the “coefficient of variation” defines the Theil statistic for α = 2 (World 
Bank, 2005; Afonso et al., 2015).  
The measure of inequality designed by Atkinson (1970) is represented by a number between 
zero and one. This index defines the share of actual income that could be eliminated leaving 
total social welfare unaffected if the remaining income were equally distributed. Therefore, in 
very equal societies the index will tend to zero, while in unequal societies, the more averse are 
people, the larger will be the value of this index (Kaplow, 2002).  
Furthermore, ratios are the most basic measures of income inequality. They are simple and 
direct, and they need few data computations. Accordingly, they do not present as much 
information as the measures described above. The income quantile share ratio divides the 
average income of the richest part of the population by the average income of the poorest part 
of the population. Therefore, the income of the rich is expressed in terms of that of the poor. 
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The most commonly used ratio is the D9/D1 which divides the income of the richest 10 
percent of the population by the income of the poorest 10 percent (Afonso, et al., 2015).  
Moreover, the inequality indicators discussed above can be decomposed in order to assess 
their major contributors. Average income levels may vary across regions, implying there 
exists “between group” inequality. Then, incomes may vary inside each region thus 
suggesting there is also a “within group” factor. These decompositions are important in order 
to create policies focused on the correct areas of development. Specifically, the presence of 
mainly “between group” inequality suggests policy makers should design regional economic 
development policies to help the poorer regions.  
Income inequality is widely used by economist to grade the performances of economies. 
Therefore, there is a tendency to examine the trend in inequality when willing to evaluate how 
well countries are doing or to see if policies have been supportive. However, researchers 
should keep in mind that inequality is not equal to social welfare, thus ranking countries in 
such a manner does not indicate their actual level of performance (Kaplow, 2002).   
Milanovic (2013) states that in order to calculate global inequality, we can break it down into 
three different concepts. The first one considers inequality between nations. This statistic may 
be represented by the Gini coefficient because it is based on GDP or mean incomes without 
weighting the population. The second concept is also based on country averages; however, 
this measure takes into account countries’ population sizes. The third approach is individual-
based and it is the most important measure for researchers interested in individuals rather than 
in nations. Therefore, each person enters the calculation with their actual level of income and 
not with that of their country. The difficulty of using this concept is that calculations require 
data from household surveys on individual incomes which must be measured in as many 
countries as possible using the same methodology.  
Figure 1.2 displays the trends in the three types of inequality concepts in the period between 
1952 and 2011. From 1960 to 1980 inequality 1 followed a quite steady trend meaning that 
both poor and rich countries had almost the same growth levels. In the 1980s globalization 
started, therefore rich nations saw higher growth levels than the poorer ones, making global 
income inequality surge. The figure shows a clear difference between the lines of inequality 
concepts 1 and 2. In the 1980s, when inequality 1 rose, inequality 2 dropped dramatically. 
Therefore, taking into account population sizes, the figure suggests that globalization made 
the world become a less unequal place.  
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These movements can be explained considering two success stories of that period. China and 
India, the two most populated countries in the world, had extremely low-income levels in the 
1980s. During the past three decades, these nations grew very quickly and converged on the 
rich world. Therefore, these high growth rates are the major factors explaining the downturn 
of inequality 2. Furthermore, since inequality 3 is calculated using household surveys, it can 
be computed only starting from the 1990s. The figure shows that using this approach we 
obtain the highest income inequality levels. Hence, the index declines when averaging the 
population’s income inequality as in the first two concepts (Milanovic, 2013).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concluding, in order to calculate the “true” level of global income inequality, Milanovic 
(2013) states that people’s incomes must be adjusted with price levels. The real welfare of 
people will be measured using purchasing power parity dollar. In this way, populations of 
“cheaper” countries will see their income in terms of nominal dollar increase  
 
1.4  Inequality trends in the European Union 
In this section is examined the distribution of income in the 28 Member States of the 
European Union (EU-28). Following the Eurostat statistical book on “Income and living 
conditions in Europe” (2010), income inequality in the EU is measured using mainly the 
income quantile share ratio and the Gini coefficient. The first measure refers to the ratio 
between the share of income owned by the top 20 percent of the population and that held by 
the bottom 20 percent.  
Figure 1.2: Global inequality concepts from 1952 to 2011 
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Figure 1.3 displays the two inequality measures for the EU-28 in the year 2015. The graph 
shows some interesting patterns. The income quantile share ratio, named S80/S20, varies 
from 3.5 to 8.3 across all EU Member States. The lowest ratios are observed in the countries 
which have recently joined the European Union (the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Slovakia). 
Then come Austria, the Benelux, France, Hungary, Malta and Nordic countries with values 
that go from 3.6 to 4.3. In Southern Europe countries (except Malta) values go from 5.2 in 
Cyprus to 6.9 in Spain. Furthermore, the highest ratios are those seen in Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
and Romania, going from 7.1 to 8.3. The EU-28 has a total S80/S20 ratio of 5.2. This measure 
is found by weighting each country by its population size, and not by considering the area as a 
whole, otherwise, it should yield a higher ratio.  
The second indicator of income inequality shown in the figure is the Gini coefficient of 
disposable income. Its values are shown on the graph’s secondary horizontal axis. The index 
varies a lot across countries, it goes from 23 percent in Slovakia to 38 percent in Lithuania. 
The trend in the Gini coefficient is similar to that of the income quantile ratio. In fact, 
Southern countries have some of the highest indexes, of about 35 percent; while the 
maximum values are attributed to Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania. Furthermore, the total 
weighted average of the index for the EU-28 is 31 percent.  
 
Figure 1.3: Income inequality in the EU, Survey Year 2015 
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Figure 1.4 plots the trend in the two income inequality indexes used above during the period 
between 2005 and 2015. The measures are calculated as a weighted average of the 28 
Member States of the European Union. The graph clearly shows that the two indicators follow 
a quite similar trend during the period. The Gini coefficient reached its highest level of almost 
31 percent in the year 2008 and then sharply decreased in the following year. A second peak 
was observed in 2011. Then, the index declined, reaching the value of 30.5 percent, and 
started increasing again in the year 2013. 
 
The quantile share ratio is expressed by the blue line in figure 1.4. It follows almost the same 
trend of the Gini index, taking on a value of 5 in 2008 and then decreasing by a tenth in the 
following years. Differently from the previous measure, in 2011 the ratio did not decline but it 
remained constant until 2013 when it then started increasing similarly to the Gini coefficient.  
As explained above, high values of the two indexes indicate high levels of income inequality 
meaning that policy makers should research new ways to smooth these disparities in the 
distribution of income. Looking at the figure it is evident that the two measures take on the 
lowest values during the years of the financial crisis and have started increasing only during 
the past three years. Hence, income inequality in the European Union has decreased with 
GDP during the 2008-2012 period. These data confirm the French government’s theory 
Figure 1.4: Income inequality in the EU from 2005 to 2015 
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according to which new wellbeing enhancing policies are needed because these new 
economic measures of performance suggest that populations are worst off in periods of high 
economic growth.  
 
1.5 Education 
The European Commission (2014) states that the objective of education is to train individuals 
for life and to impart them a sense of democratic citizenship. This should be done for all 
learners regardless of their culture and socio-economic background. Then, producing quality 
education yields a productive and innovative labour force, which accordingly generates 
sustainable growth patterns.  
Education is one of the eight key dimensions of well-being identified in the Report by Stiglitz 
et al. (2009). In fact, economic research suggests that skills embodied in the population are 
one of the determinants of economic production and quality of life. There exist three main 
factors that determine this level of human capital, namely: 
1) Investments in education and training; 
2) Parental inputs: such as supervision and mentoring; 
3) Societal resources: such as libraries and museums. 
Moreover, better-educated people develop more positive evaluations of their life, they 
generally have better health, lower unemployment, greater engagement in civic life and more 
social connections. Therefore, education investments benefit both the person acquiring it and 
the society in which they live.  
Furthermore, the distribution of education has an impact on both economic growth and the 
distribution of income. In fact, limited opportunities to invest in education, differences in 
quality of education or in educational attainment may lead to increasing income inequalities if 
coupled with poor redistributive policies (Heshmati, 2004). 
There exist educational indicators that refer to both inputs and outputs. Measures of education 
input include school enrollment numbers, educational expenditures, and school resources; 
while measures of outputs consist of graduation rates, years of schooling and literacy, and 
numeracy achievements. However, these indicators may highlight contrasting patterns. For 
instance, some countries may combine excellent achievements for university students with 
large under-achievements for youths from low-income families. Hence, using summary 
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measures, such as mean years of schooling, one would not identify these disparities though 
they are significant in terms of quality of life.  
A significant limitation of these measurement tools is that many of these measures were not 
developed to measure the population’s capabilities, but for assessing educational policies. 
Therefore, they focus on a narrow set of competencies. Secondly, knowledge is not 
determined only by schooling but there exist a variety of inputs that lead to increases in skills. 
Increasing evidence shows that experiences and “soft” skills acquired during childhood matter 
for people’s schooling and quality of life. Thus, measuring education levels does not provide 
the full picture (Stiglitz et al., 2009).  
The World Bank (2005) states that analysing household living standards, there are three 
classes of commonly used indicators of education:  
1) The household level of education measured by the rate of literacy and the years of 
completed education;  
2) The availability of educational services such as proximity to schools; 
3) The level of adoption of these services measured using registration numbers, dropout 
rates and average educational spending per child. 
The level of education in the household is an important indicator of the ability of the poor 
people to exploit income-earning opportunities.  
 
1.6  Trends in education in the European Union 
The Eurostat Database for European statistics offers a wide range of education measures that 
enables researchers to evaluate the educational level of the population of the 28 European 
Union Member States. In this section are discussed the indicators of education providing 
information on educational attainment, participation, personnel and educational expenditure.  
The “International Standard Classification of Education” (ISCED) adopted by UNESCO 
(2012) is used to allow cross-national comparisons of data. ISCED serves as a framework to 
organize education programs into nine internationally agreed levels: 
1) Level 0: early childhood education; 
2) Level 1: primary education; 
3) Level 2: lower secondary education; 
4) Level 3: upper secondary education; 
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5) Level 4: post-secondary non-tertiary education; 
6) Level 5: short-cycle tertiary education 
7) Level 6: bachelor degree or equivalent; 
8) Level 7: master degree or equivalent; 
9) Level 8: doctoral degrees or equivalent. 
 
 
In order to understand the educational indicators in this section, it is important to explain the 
structure of education in the European Union. Figure 1.5 shows the years of compulsory 
education, the age at which students start primary school and the age at which they end lower 
secondary education. The nations are ordered by the duration of compulsory education, which 
ranges from 9 to 13 years. The two bars indicate the age at which children start primary 
education and the age at which they end lower secondary education, while the two dots 
display the starting and ending age of compulsory education. The Netherlands has 13 years of 
mandatory schooling; thus it is the country with the highest number. Differently from the 
majority of the European countries, in this nation children are obliged to participate in the last 
year of childhood education and to attend school until the age of 18. In the EU there is an 
average of 10 years of compulsory education. In fact, the figure shows that in most countries 
Figure 1.5: Compulsory education in the EU 
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students must attend school from 6 to 16 years old. Furthermore, looking at the graph we 
notice that, in the majority of nations, primary schooling starts at the age of 6, whereas lower 
secondary education ends at various ages throughout the member countries. In Italy, Hungary, 
the United Kingdom and Belgium students start ISCED level 2 education at the age of 14, 
whereas in Lithuania students are obliged to attend school until the age of 16 but lower 
secondary education ends when they are 17.  
Figure 1.6 shows the level of educational attainment of the population in the European Union 
aged 15-64 for the year 2015. On the horizontal axis are the countries of the EU, whereas on 
the vertical axis are indicated the population percentages. The graph groups the ISCED levels 
into three classes: levels 0-2, levels 3-4 and levels 5-8. The majority of the population in the 
EU-28 holds an upper secondary or post-secondary level of education. In fact, the figure 
shows that the bar referring to this level of education carries the higher population 
percentages among all countries except Malta, Portugal and Spain. Accordingly, in these three 
countries most individuals hold a lower secondary education diploma at best. More than half 
of the population in Portugal holds only a 0-2 level qualification. Therefore, it is the country 
with the least educated population. Furthermore, we notice that in the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, Cyprus and Benelux countries there is about the same percentage of population 
holding upper-secondary and tertiary qualifications. In fact, almost 40 percent of the 
Figure 1.6: Educational attainment levels in the EU, Survey Year 2015 
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population in the United Kingdom has a university degree, therefore it can be defined as the 
EU-28 most educated country. As suggested by the European Commission (2014), these 
countries with high educational attainment levels should see higher growth rates in the 
succeeding years. Then, the Czech Republic has almost 70 percent of the population holding 
an upper-secondary and post-secondary qualification. This can be considered as being the 
country with the most uniformly educated population. Furthermore, despite the 13 years of 
compulsory education in the Netherlands, almost 30 percent of its population hold only a 
level 0-2 qualification. 
Figure 1.7 shows the trend in education in the European Union. As discussed in the previous 
section, in order to get the total EU-28 statistic, the values of each country are weighted by 
their population index. The graph clearly shows that the percentage of individuals with upper 
secondary or post-secondary qualifications remained stable, fluctuating around 46 percent 
over the entire 2005-2015 period. However, the proportion of individuals with at most lower 
secondary qualifications sharply decreased with the rise in the percentage of individuals 
holding a tertiary degree. In fact, the level 0-2 line decreased by about 20 percent during the 
ten-year period. In 2005, 34 percent of the EU population held a low educational level, the 
evident increase in the European’s education made the 2015 value drop to 27 percent. 
Moreover, the individuals holding a university degree in the EU increased by 36 percent 
between 2005 and 2015. The 5-8 level line starts at 20 percent in 2005 and arrives at 27 
percent in 2015, suggesting there has been a strong increase in the level of qualifications 
obtained by the population of the EU-28 Member States.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.7: Educational attainment in the EU from 2005 to 2015 
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Furthermore, according to the EU statistical office report on participation in education, one 
out of ten individuals aged 18-24 have completed lower secondary education at most and are 
not attending further schooling. The countries with the highest rate of early leavers, measured 
as a percentage of the total young population, are Romania, Malta, and Spain, which have 
rates of about 20 percent. On the contrary, in Croatia and Slovenia, less than 5 percent of the 
young population leaves school after completing lower secondary education (Eurostat, 2017).  
Figure 1.8 presents a measure of adoption of the educational services. Due to data availability, 
the graph plots the students to teachers ratio in 2014 for all EU-28 countries except Greece, 
Ireland, and the Netherlands. It groups the educational levels into two classes: primary and 
lower-secondary education, and upper-secondary education.  
 
The figure does not show a precise pattern. Some countries have a higher student to teacher 
ratios at lower educational levels while others have the highest value in upper-secondary 
education. Moreover, countries as Austria, Italy, Lithuania and Portugal maintain the same 
ratio for the two levels of schooling. Then, the lowest ratios are seen in Lithuania for both 
classes, where it is equal to about 8 percent. Furthermore, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Malta 
have an average of fewer than 10 students per teacher in the lower educational class. These 
values suggest that the countries have high educational funding enabling them to pursue high 
Figure 1.8: Ratio of students to teachers in in the EU, Survey Year 2014 
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performances in education through a low student-teacher ratio. Furthermore, Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, France, and Portugal have a mean value of fewer than 10 students per 
teacher in upper-secondary education. Then, the highest ratio is seen in the United Kingdom. 
It is equal to almost 18 percent for levels 1 and 2, and to 16 percent at level 3. However, as 
mentioned above, this country is among the most educated EU nations. Therefore, this does 
not imply that the country gives little attention to education but rather that there are high 
numbers of students.   
Education in Europe is mostly funded by the public, therefore educational systems must be 
adequately resourced in order to be successful. Starting from the year 2011, the EU-28 public 
expenditure on education has declined by about 1 percent per year. After three years of 
contraction, the budget starting growing again from the year 2014. In fact, two-thirds of 
Member States register a rise in that year. The biggest increase was seen in Bulgaria, Latvia, 
and Hungary where the budgets rose by more than 5 percent. Moreover, Portugal and Cyprus 
experienced the largest decrease in the EU between 2010 and 2014, having a cumulative drop 
of about 18 percent in that period.  
The share of public expenditure dedicated to education can be interpreted as quantifying the 
public’s commitment to the sector. During 2014 the EU average was about 10 percent.  Figure 
1.9 displays these percentages for each member state, showing that two-thirds of the countries 
devote more public resources than the EU average. On the other hand, the large economies 
Figure 1.9: Expenditure on education as % of total public expenditure in 2014 
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Germany, France, and Italy, invest fewer public money than the EU average. Italy dedicated 
less than 8 percent of its public budget to education and is thus the country with the lowest 
education investments (European Commission, 2016).  
Concluding, the European Commission (2016) states that improving education is a complex 
task. Policymakers use the previously mentioned indicators to drive reforms aimed at 
improving educational outcomes. Each EU country is in charge of its own education system. 
However, EU policies support national actions by helping nations to address common 
challenges. Member countries participate in the Education and Training forum. During this 
conference, nations exchange best practices, mutual learning and gather information for 
policy reforms. In 2009, the forum set the following six common EU education targets to 
attain before 2020: 
1) Children aged 4 or more participating in early childhood education should be at least 
95% of the population; 
2) Under-skilled 15-year-olds in reading, maths, and sciences should be below 15%; 
3) Early leavers from education and training aged 18-24 should be less than 10% 
4) Tertiary education attainment levels of the population aged 30-24 of at least 40%; 
5) Employed individuals aged 20-34 with at least an upper secondary education level 
should be a minimum of 82%; 
6) The proportion of adults participating in lifelong learning should be at least 15%.  
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1 Theoretical Literature 
The inheritance of each individual influences its tendency to invest in education. There is 
much literature stating the importance of parental background in determining children’s 
education and, consequently, shaping income distributions. Galor and Zeira (1993) construct a 
two-period model with inter-generational altruism and overlapping generations. Individuals 
are assumed to be identical. They differ only with respect to their inherited wealth and they 
prefer investing in human capital as it pays back more than working as unskilled individuals. 
They can produce a good through an unskilled-intensive or skill-intensive process. In the first 
period individuals can invest in human capital or work as unskilled. All individuals will work, 
consume and leave bequest in the second period. Therefore, depending on their educational 
level they will be skilled or unskilled individuals. Authors assume a higher borrowing interest 
rate than lending rate. As a result, individuals with lower initial wealth will have difficulties 
accessing investment in education. Hence, high income families, where all individuals invest 
in education, will be skilled workers and leave a large bequest. Differently, individuals from 
low income families will be unskilled workers and leave a small bequest to their children. 
Thus, the distribution of wealth affects the amount of investment in human capital, and has 
short-run and long- run implications.  
Evidence supports the idea that earnings are positively correlated across generations. One 
explanation is that during youth individuals acquire characteristics which may be productivity 
enhancing depending on parental income. Loury (1981) builds a model in which individuals 
live for two periods and families are made up of one parent and one offspring. In this model, 
abilities and background of parents are diverse, therefore families will have different incomes. 
Parents are altruistic, hence, they will invest in consumption and training of their offspring. 
They produce a perishable good in a certain quantity depending on their ability and training. 
The income derived from this good will be used for consumption and training of their child. 
Altruism is modelled in the parent’s utility function as it depends on family consumption and 
on its child’s future earnings.  Earnings of the child depend on the production possibilities of 
the parent and on its ability. There exists an optimal investment function which considers 
parental income and training of their offspring. Parents are indirectly affected by their child’s 
income, thus, in case of high intergenerational mobility, individuals will consider high 
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incomes as less an advantage and low incomes as less a disadvantage than in cases of little 
social mobility. The author also considers a model in absence of loans and insurance markets. 
Due to these market imperfections resource allocation may not be efficient. Consequently, 
children in low-income families may have a limited access to training due to their parents’ 
restricted resources.  
Intergenerational mobility is determined by a variety of factors. Becker and Tomes (1986) 
discuss these determinants by formulating a systematic model relying on utility-maximizing 
behaviour of all participants, stochastic forces and equilibrium in markets. Parents are 
concerned about their children. Thus, the analysis comprises altruism, investments in human 
capital, assortative mating, demand for children, parental treatment of handicapped children 
and expectations about future events. The degree of inheritability is defined in the relation 
between parents’ and children’s endowments, while cultural and genetic inheritances are 
transmitted automatically from parents to children. Borrowing capacity is an important 
determinant of intergenerational mobility in earnings. Thus, poor families will have 
difficulties accessing the lending market to finance human capital investments for their 
children, and intergenerational mobility in earnings will depend on their willingness to self-
finance their children’s education. Moreover, assets act as buffers to counteract regressions to 
the mean in children’s earnings. Low and middle income families who do not leave bequests 
have higher equilibrium marginal rates of return on human capital investments of children and 
consumption will regress upwards. Differently, consumption in high income families that 
bequeath to their children will regress down to the mean.  
There exist also economic development patterns which are affected by the composition of 
human capital. Interactions between the externalities from the home environment and 
externalities from global technology determine the distribution of income, human capital and 
economic growth. In developing countries home environment externalities are dominating and 
polarize the distribution of income whereas in advanced economies the global technological 
externality dominates and contracts the distribution of income. Polarization is an essential 
ingredient for economic growth. In fact, economies that implement equality enhancing 
policies prematurely may be trapped at low levels of development. The paper by Galor and 
Tsiddon (1997) analyses these interactions in the distribution of human capital across 
generations and demonstrates its significance. They develop a model with a small overlapping 
generations economy in which individuals have same preferences and human capital. They 
differ only in the level of human capital of their parents and therefore investments in 
education will have different efficacies. Parents influence the level of human capital of their 
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children directly, through home environment, and indirectly, through the level of education of 
the society. This externality will then affect the level of technological progress. Technological 
progress raises the rate of return on investments in children’s education and, accordingly, 
stimulates further investments in education. In other words, individuals within a dynasty 
interact through the home environment externality whereas interactions across dynasties take 
place through the global technological externality. These externalities play an essential role in 
the distribution of human capital, in inequalities of income and in the development of 
economies.  
Moreover, the distribution of wealth of a population has a macroeconomic impact and 
therefore determines the amount of aggregate output of the economy. There is much literature 
in political economy suggesting the best policies in order to deal with these issues. The model 
of family behaviour described by Becker and Tomes (1986) offers an explanation of the 
determinants of intergenerational mobility and suggests that public policies can be used to 
solve these matters. Loury (1981) states that inefficiencies in resource allocation due to 
market imperfections could be reduced by the government redistributing incomes more 
equally through a redistributive tax. Because of intergenerational altruism, if such a program 
were to be implemented permanently parents would consider their children’s’ income as less 
risky and this policy would have a welfare effect. The excess burden represented by the 
redistributive tax will be dominated by this insurance activity, as long as the redistribution is 
not too extensive, making parents better off. Then, the model by Galor and Zeira (1993) 
shows that the cost of education can be subsidised by the government applying a tax on 
skilled workers in the next period. In such a way, both investments and outputs would 
increase in the short and in the long run. 
The presence of market imperfections and externalities supports interventions in education. 
Defining the best policies to deal with these problems depends on the characteristics of 
individuals. Many studies have concluded that public support for tertiary education concerns a 
transfer of resources from lower income families to higher income families. Fernandez and 
Rogerson (1995) develop a model on the political economy of educational subsidies and 
explain this mechanism as being the result of a vote on the subsidization of education. Public 
education is only partially publicly provided. Hence, poorer individuals cannot benefit from it. 
The argument is developed formally in a model with imperfect capital markets and 
individuals differing only in their initial income. The cost of education can be subsidized by 
means of a proportional income tax imposed on the general public. The tax rate is established 
through a majority vote. The subsidy is available only to whom chooses to acquire an 
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education. In such a way, individuals will choose to invest in it depending on their income 
and on the share of subsidization of education. Subsidization, however, has different 
efficiency consequences depending on the economy. In a poor economy educational subsidies 
have a positive effect: they will increase attainment and in turn enhance efficiency. To the 
contrary, in a wealthy economy educational attainment may be reduced and efficiency is 
never enhanced. Economies with higher income inequalities are more likely to maintain this 
unequal distribution of income over time. Furthermore, making education more costly may 
benefit wealthy individuals because they will be the only benefiting from it and they will 
extract resources from the others.  
Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) construct a second model considering education financing 
decision of different communities. Financing education is a form of human capital investment 
because it will yield higher returns in later life. If there are no borrowing opportunities to 
finance current educational expenditures, low income families may make inefficiently low 
investments in their children’s education. The authors consider intergenerational dynamics 
using a two-period model with overlapping generations. In each period there exist a large 
number of families made up of one parent and one child. The income of the parent is given by 
the education received as a child and by an idiosyncratic random shock. Given their income, 
parents decide in which community to live in and each community decides the amount of 
resources to assign to public education via a majority vote. This mechanism yields the income 
distribution of the next generation of adults. In this analysis incomes are heterogeneous across 
households and there is mobility across communities which provide education. Therefore, 
public education funding is determined locally in that spending on education is correlated 
with the income of the community. Richer communities will benefit from a higher quality of 
education than lower income communities, such that children raised in higher income families 
will have a higher expected income than children raised in lower income families. 
Furthermore, Fernandez and Rogerson analyse a reform substituting locally financed 
educational systems with a state financed one which divides educational expenditure equally 
among all students. Results demonstrate that using a centralized system offers efficiency gains 
by providing a higher average income, higher average educational expenditure and higher 
welfare.  
Education finance policies remove barriers to the acquisition of education by publicly funding 
education or by removing liquidity constraints. In such a way, individuals paying for their 
education with money received by their parents will be less liquidity constrained. Owen and 
Weil (1998) show that there exist multiple steady state equilibria meaning that economies 
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with same preferences and technologies but different initial wealth distributions can reach 
different steady states. Policies lead to changes in the share of educated workers and yield 
different benefits. Increases in educated labour force causes changes in relative wages and 
economic growth. In fact, educated and non-educated labour force are complementary, 
meaning that in an economy with high levels of educated workers there will be higher relative 
wages for non-educated workers. Consequently, children from these families will be more 
likely to afford an education. There will be a smaller wage gap between the two types of 
workers decreasing the incentive for children from educated families to become educated 
workers. Contrarily, in an economy with low levels of educated workers the wage gap 
between the two individuals will be larger. This will decrease the number of children from 
non-educated families able to afford an education and will increase the incentive for children 
from educated families to become educated workers. In other words, we can define two 
steady states: one with high education, mobility and income; and the other with lower 
education, mobility and income and with higher income inequality. Furthermore, these 
differences in mobility will transform into differences in the efficiency of education, meaning 
that in economies with high mobility individuals with high ability will be those receiving the 
larger share of educational resources.  
A strand of literature aims at explaining the role of the state and of the political process in 
income inequalities. Countries with similar economic and political conditions may not give 
the same importance to factors such as social insurance and fiscal redistribution resulting in 
different social contracts. Policies that redistribute wealth from richer to poorer individuals 
have a positive net effect on growth, output and ex ante welfare. Net efficiency gains deriving 
from these policies have very popular support which decreases when inequality rises. In fact, 
such a practice meets a high consensus in homogeneous society but not in an unequal one. In 
unequal societies a lower rate of redistribution will increase future income inequality because 
individuals will continue to be wealth constrained. Therefore, temporary shocks to the income 
distribution or to the political system may have permanent consequences. Bénabou (2000) 
describes these mechanisms in a stochastic growth model with heterogeneous agents and 
incomplete asset markets. Agents vote for redistributive fiscal or educational policies. In the 
short run redistribution is U-shaped relative to income inequality while they are negatively 
correlated in the long run. Furthermore, the model shows that there exists a critical level for 
gains in ex ante welfare due to redistribution. Below this threshold, there is a single social 
contract and no political influence can sustain more than one contract. Above this threshold 
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multiple social contracts arise provided that the rich exercise a political weight which is 
neither too large nor too small.  
Individuals from low income families may rely on public schooling and the quality of public 
schools is determined by the amount of public spending in education. Therefore, individuals 
with different wealth have different educational opportunities. Ferreira (2001) develops a two-
period model in which policies are determined endogenously and studies the interactions 
between educational, political and wealth inequalities. Households are ex ante identical in 
every aspect except for initial wealth. In the first period they divide their time between 
studying or working as unskilled and in the second period agents consume and bequeath the 
good produced. According to this model there may be persisting inequalities in education due 
to missing credit markets which force poor individuals to attend schools of lower quality and 
have lower lifetime wealth. Persisting educational inequalities are influenced also by the 
voting equilibrium. This equilibrium may determine levels of public expenditure which are 
not sufficiently high and cannot increase the quality of schools attended by the poor. A 
transitory increase in taxes or public expenditures will eradicate the poor from the trap of low 
education-low productivity and increase aggregate output. Higher taxes, however, will make 
richer agents worse off. In order to escape this inefficiency, the political regime will need to 
transfer the power from the rich to the poor.  
Literature distinguishes between the effect of public and private education on income 
inequalities. Public education generates greater decreases in income inequalities but private 
education allows individuals to have higher per capita incomes except for situations in which 
income inequalities are initially large. When income is below average individuals will choose 
public education over private. Therefore, the distribution of income affects agents in their 
choice between public and private education. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) obtain these 
results building a two-period model with an overlapping generations economy. The education 
of the child depends on that of the parent, on the quality of schools and on the time spent in 
school. The authors differentiate between public and private education. Parents have a bequest 
motive defined in the quality of schools of their offspring. Under the public education system, 
parents’ bequest is the same across agents since school quality is common to all. The 
government uses tax income levied from the old to provide free public education and the 
schools’ quality will depend on the amount of taxes collected. The tax rate is determined 
through a majority voting. Under the private education regime, parents’ bequest is specific to 
each household. Hence, parents’ income is distributed between consumption and quality of 
education received by their children.  
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Glomm and Ravikumar (2002) developed a second model using the basic framework of that 
in 1992. The aim of their analysis was to study the distribution of income under public 
education and to evaluate the behaviour of economies under different levels of public 
education funding. All agents have the same access to public education expenditures and they 
use identical learning technologies. Agents are provided with the same quantity of public 
input to the learning technology, therefore income should converge. The authors consider 
access to public education to be equal, but in these cases the income gap between high income 
and low income individuals in the short run may widen. Contrarily, in the long run publicly 
provided education decreases income inequality. Income inequality depends on the elasticity 
of substitution between leisure and consumption and on the elasticity of human capital of 
parents in the learning technology. Results show that under certain conditions, incomes below 
a certain level diverge, while those above this critical level converge. Hence, despite the fact 
that public education is identical across individuals, income inequality may initially increase 
but it will eventually decline. Furthermore, the effect of taxes on the distribution of income is 
ambiguous. When tax rates are sufficiently small, a raise in the tax rate decreases the income 
inequality. The opposite applies in situations when tax rates are high. Finally, tax rates have 
an indirect effect on the incentives to acquire human capital.  
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Table 2.1: Synthesis of theoretical literature  
Authors  Topic  Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
Galor and 
Zeira (1993) 
 Education and 
income inequality 
 Individuals' level of wealth affects their tendency to 
invest in education.  
Loury (1981) 
 Education and 
income inequality 
 Earnings are positively correlated across 
generations. 
Becker and 
Tomes 
(1986) 
 
Intergenerational 
mobility 
 Children from families that do not leave bequests 
have higher marginal human capital returns and 
higher incomes than individuals from bequeathing 
families. 
Galor and 
Tsiddon 
(1997) 
 
Development, 
education and income 
 Home environment externalities and global 
technological externalities affect individual's level of 
education and income. 
Fernandez 
and Rogerson 
(1995) 
 
Development and 
educational subsidies  
 Educational subsidies have a positive effect in poor 
economies but may reduce efficiency in wealthy 
states.  
Fernandez 
and Rogerson 
(1998) 
 
Development and 
education 
 
Public education funding is determined locally, thus 
richer communities have higher education quality. 
Owen and 
Weil (1998) 
 
Education finance 
policies and income 
inequality 
 Educational policies, yield more educated workers, 
higher wages to non-educated workers, lower 
income gaps and give lower incentives to children 
from educated families to become educated workers.  
Benabou 
(2000) 
 
Redistribution and 
income inequality 
 In the short run redistribution is U-shaped relative to 
income inequality while they are negatively 
correlated in the long run. 
Ferreira 
(2001) 
 
Education quality and 
income inequality.  
 Individuals with different wealth have different 
educational opportunities and, accordingly, different 
lifetime wealth.  
Glomm and 
Ravikumar 
(1992) 
 Public/private 
education and income 
inequality 
 Public education generates greater decreases in 
income inequalities but private education allows 
individuals to have higher per capita incomes.  
Glomm and 
Ravikumar 
(2002) 
 
Public education and 
income inequality  
 Public education may initially increase the income 
gap between low and high income individuals, but it 
decreases income inequality in the long run.  
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2.2 Empirical Literature 
De Gregorio and Lee (2002) investigate the relation between education and income inequality 
looking at empirical cross-country evidence. The paper uses an internationally comparable 
panel data set of income distribution and human capital. Authors consider a wide number of 
countries measured from 1960 to 1990 at five-year intervals. Specifically, data on income 
distribution is taken by Deininger and Squire (1996) and measures of education are build up 
from the Barro and Lee (1996) data set on educational attainment. Both intertemporal and 
cross-national relations between education and income are investigated. The analysis uses the 
Gini Coefficient, a measure of income distribution, as the dependent variable and includes 
factors of educational inequality, education dispersion and GDP per capita. Using a model 
with “seemingly-unrelated-regression” (SUR) techniques, results show that countries with 
higher levels of educational attainment have lower income inequality. Thus, policies in the 
educational field can help reduce inequalities through higher educational spending. 
Furthermore, the model comprises a set of dummy variables to distinguish between certain 
regional characteristics that determine different income distributions. Findings show that 
income distributions in African and Latin American countries are less equal than in other 
regions.  
The model by Sylwester (2002) shows that countries allocating higher percentages of GDP to 
public education have higher levels of human capital. Consequently, higher investments in 
education will lower income inequalities and boost economic growth. The author runs a cross 
country analysis during the period between 1970-1990, and uses a sample of 50 countries 
from all over the world. Running least square regressions, the model demonstrates that 
countries with higher levels of average educational attainment have lower income inequality. 
Furthermore, evidence shows that there is a greater effect in OECD countries than in less 
developed countries. 
Abdullah et al. (2015) examine the effect of education on inequality using a comprehensive 
meta-regression analysis (MRA) of the existing empirical literature to estimate the average 
effect of education on income inequality. The analysis uses 64 econometric studies and results 
show that education is an effective tool to reduce income inequality. The greatest effects can 
be seen on the low and high income distributions. Specifically, education reduces the 
proportion of income of the rich, but it has a greater impact increasing that of the poor. 
Moreover, some of the results show that secondary education is more effective in reducing 
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inequality than primary and higher education. This suggests that governments should redirect 
funds towards secondary schooling.  
Education finance reforms increase aggregate spending on education. Murray et al. (1995) 
analyse the impact of court-ordered finance reforms on school resources. The authors use data 
from 16,000 school districts from 46 states during the period between 1972-1992. Education 
finance reforms have been forced by State supreme courts in 11 states, therefore the model 
uses fixed effects to exploit time series data for each state and assess the effect of reforms on 
the distribution of resources. Outcomes reveal that states which were forced to implement 
finance reforms saw a 19 to 34 percent reduction in within-state income inequality. 
Specifically, reforms increased spending in the poorest districts while spending in the richest 
districts remained unchanged. Therefore, raising aggregate spending on education.  
Checchi and Van de Werfhorst (2014) investigate the importance of educational policies 
looking at the distribution of quantity and quality of education and at their link with income 
inequality. Quality of education is studied looking at student performance on standardized 
tests, while education quantity is measured referring to educational attainment. Furthermore, 
the authors look at the distribution of income to study the effect of educational reforms. Data 
is taken for countries from the European Union and the model focuses on individuals born 
between 1950 and 1981. The model is developed controlling for country-specific and time 
fixed effects, and presents OLS, IV and GMM estimations. Results show that distributions of 
quantity and quality of education are affected by educational reforms, and that inequality in 
education affects income inequality. Therefore, educational policies are part of an effective 
strategy to deal with inequalities in income distributions.  
Furthermore, literature focuses on the relations between family background, education and 
wages. The paper by Altonji and Dunn (1996) aims at examining whether the payoff between 
working and spending a year in school changes with family background. The empirical model 
examines wage equations and considers the educational slopes as being influenced by family 
background. The authors use data from two surveys conducted in the US. The first survey 
focuses on the population aged 14 to 24. Young men were surveyed in the period between 
1966-1981, whereas young woman were surveyed from 1968 to 1988. The second survey 
uses data from 1968 to 1989 and is based on the population aged 24 to 55. Family background 
is measured considering father’s and mother’s education. In the preferred specification, the 
authors consider siblings’ education in order to take into account family fixed effect and to 
control for unobserved differences in household environment. Results differ for men and 
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women. For men, parents’ education has a significant positive effect on the education slope, 
especially mother’s education. For women, mother’s education has a significant effect when 
using data from one survey, but not considering the other. The effect of siblings on returns to 
education, that is inferred by parental education, has a limited importance. Thus, parental 
characteristics have a significant effect on the income level of children. Notably, an extra year 
of education for parents would increase the monetary value of one school year for children.  
Moreover, children’s skills depend on inputs they receive by parents and on the ethnic 
environment in which their parents have invested, the “ethnic capital”. Studies hypothesize 
that ethnicity may be considered as an externality in the process of human capital 
accumulation. Therefore, ethnicity is included in economic models of intergenerational 
mobility and results show that differences in ethnic skills of children are likely to persist 
along generations if ethnicity is sufficiently strong. Borjas (1992) runs an empirical analyses 
using data from the US during the period between 1977-1989 and looks at the effects of 
ethnicity on the education and wages of the population aged 18-64. Ethnic capital is measured 
as the mean in skills of the ethnic group of parent’s generation. The estimation is done using 
generalized least squares and findings show that ethnicity has a positive and significant effect 
on educational attainment of participants. Coefficients of ethnic capital and parental education 
have similar magnitudes, suggesting they are equally important in determining the skills of 
future generations. Regressing occupational attainment, results show a strong link between 
that of parents and of children. Furthermore, coefficients increase when including ethnic 
capital in the regression. This demonstrates it is more important than parental occupation in 
the transmission of occupational success between generations. In other words, children 
belonging to ethnic groups with low levels of human capital will have limited occupational 
and educational outcomes because of the low average in the quality of the group.  Therefore, 
there is an important link between skills across generations.  
Simon Kuznets (1955) hypothesized that workers transferring between sectors at different 
income levels will initially raise inequality because the share of high income workers will 
increase. Eventually, income inequality will decrease as the share of low income workers 
shrinks. The expanding sector, however, may have more inequality, and therefore will delay 
the peak in aggregate inequality. Knight and Sabot (1983) analyse this Kuznets effect 
referring to the transfer of worker from low income rural areas to high income urban areas. 
Changes in the income distribution arise in response to increases in the share of educated 
workers in low-income countries. The analysis is conducted using three comparable surveys 
of wage employees carried out in Kenya in 1980 and in Tanzania in 1971 and 1980. Authors 
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estimate an earnings function including educational categories as independent variables. They 
claim that the expansion of education has a “composition” and “wage compression” effect. 
The “composition” effect initially raises the size of the educated group and will initially 
increase income inequality, but it will eventually lower it. Then, the “wage compression” 
effect reduces the premium on education, because the supply of educated workers has risen, 
and therefore lowers income inequality. Since this mechanism occurs within the expansion of 
the urban sector, it accelerates the arrival at the point above which economic growth decreases 
overall inequality.  
Skills mismatch is also an important source of income inequality. Slonimczyk (2013) analyses 
the distribution of wages in the US for a 30-years period, from 1973 to 2002. The model is 
developed using an extended earning function which decomposes education into: required, 
deficit and surplus qualifications, and analyses skill mismatch using OLS estimation. Results 
show that these factors of skill mismatch explain the variance of earnings and the Gini 
coefficient. In particular, surplus qualifications have been one of the main drivers in the 
increase of income inequality in the second half of the income distribution. Thus, increasing 
education requirements would eliminate the mismatch and reduce inequality in real earnings. 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that there has been an increase in over-qualification rates 
while under-educated workers have decreased.  
Lastly, politics influences income inequality not only through state redistribution but also 
through markets. Morgan and Kelly (2013) argue that governments can influence income 
inequality through redistributive taxes and transfers and through a mechanism known as 
“market conditioning”, where the state influences the behaviour of individuals. This 
mechanism is important particularly in the developing world. In their model, the authors 
analyse whether governments use policies to shape markets and, hence, influence income 
inequality. The sample includes data from 19 Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries 
measured from the year 1980 to 2000. The model is estimated using OLS and Rogers (1994) 
robust-cluster standard errors. Results show that market inequality is affected more by 
political power than by redistribution and that investments in human capital decreases 
inequality. Hence, countries should prioritize investments in social spending when seeking to 
fight inequality.  
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Table 2.2: Synthesis of empirical literature 
Authors Topic Data Estimation Conclusions 
     
De Gregorio 
and Lee 
(2002) 
Education and 
income 
inequality 
49 
countries, 
1960-
1990 
SUR 
Countries with higher levels of 
educational attainment have 
lower income inequality. 
Sylwester 
(2002) 
Education and 
income 
inequality 
50 
countries, 
1970-
1990 
OLS 
Countries allocating higher 
percentages of GDP to public 
education lowers income 
inequality and boosts economic 
growth. 
Checchi and 
Van de 
Werfhorst 
(2014)  
Educational 
policies and 
income 
inequality 
EU,  
1950-
1981 
OLS, IV, 
GMM 
Educational reforms affect the 
quantity and quality of 
education and inequality in 
education affects income 
inequality. 
Murray et al. 
(1995) 
Education 
finance reforms 
and income 
inequality 
US,  
1972-
1992 
FE 
States that were forced to 
implement finance reforms saw 
a 19 to 34 percent reduction in 
within-state income inequality. 
Altonji and 
Dunn (1996)  
Family 
background, 
education and 
income 
US,  
1966-
1989 
FE, RE 
An extra year of education for 
parents increases the monetary 
value of one school year for 
children.  
Borjas 
(1992)  
Ethnicity, 
education and 
income 
US,  
1977-
1989 
GLS 
Ethnicity has a positive and 
significant effect on occupation 
of children. It is more important 
than parental occupation in the 
transmission of occupational 
success between generations. 
Slonimczyk 
(2013) 
Skill mismatch 
and income 
inequality 
US,  
1973-
2002 
OLS 
Surplus qualifications have 
been one of the main drivers in 
the increase of income 
inequality in the second half of 
the income distribution.  
Morgan and 
Kelly (2013)  
Market and 
income 
inequality 
LAC 
countries, 
1980-
2000 
OLS 
Market inequality is affected 
more by political power than by 
redistribution and that 
investments in human capital 
decreases inequality.  
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CHAPTER 3 – ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK  
 
3.1  The Higher Education Act 
Developed countries have seen higher education in continuous change over the last decades. 
The unceasing increases in student numbers created pressures on the institutions and on the 
public which had to finance most of the costs. Concerns about efficiency and outcomes of 
public universities starting growing and contributed to the belief that an organisational and 
financial change was needed (Beblavy et al., 2010).  
The Slovak Republic responded to these developments through various initiatives which 
aimed at strengthening universities’ private resources. Innovations in the financing of higher 
education in Slovakia started in 2000 with the government’s White Paper “Concept of Further 
Development of Slovak Higher Education in the 21st Century”. The publication stated the 
need for a profound change in the governance, financing and legal framework of higher 
education. During 2000 and 2001 some of these changes were implemented, but the new 
system was adopted only in 2002 when the Slovak Republic introduced the Higher Education 
Act 131/2002. The reform has transformed public universities from state institutions into 
organisations with a non-profit management structure. At most, 90 percent of their 
expenditures are now covered by the state budget, and the rest is sustained by universities. In 
fact, higher education institutions (HEIs) manage both their tangible and intangible assets to 
adapt to these new conditions. Moreover, with this major higher education reform, the 
government decided to transform the rules related to the spending of public subsidies by 
creating a strong set of incentives that would make universities eager to pursue these 
objectives. Lastly, Slovakia signed the Bologna Declaration in 1999 but it was only with the 
Higher Education Act that all its components were implemented into Slovakian HEIs 
(Beblavy et al., 2010; EHEA, 2003). 
The reform is now described in details following Beblavy et al. (2010) and Mederly (2006). 
Before 2002, public HEIs in Slovakia had funding and financial management systems 
characterised by the following features: 
1) All revenues of HEIs had to be transferred to the central budget; 
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2) HEIs used mostly incremental budgeting1, taking into account underspending, but did 
not consider outputs such as students, graduates, and publications; 
3) Subsidies given to HEIs were internally structured by the government and could not 
be modified; 
4) The government owned property and assets of HEIs and invested in them by 
providing discretionary and targeted subsidies, by that controlling capital budgets’ of 
HEIs; 
5) HEIs used cash-based accounting systems. 
This funding mechanism was problematic because it did not encourage public universities to 
improve their performances. Specifically, increases in the number full-time students did not 
convert into higher subsidies. However, there was a lack of clarity regarding the treatment of 
part-time students. Therefore, universities decided to charge fees for these students and to 
work to increase these numbers. Moreover, the funding formula did not consider publications, 
so HEIs were not encouraged to improve research. Then, if institutions managed to have 
savings, these were removed from the budget of the next year. In this way, any incentive for 
efficient asset management was removed. Finally, these management problems and the lack 
of long-term planning were coupled with political interference.   
Following the new system in place since 2002, the budgeting of government subsidies 
considers both inputs and outputs. HEIs receive funds based on a publicly known funding 
formula which reflects the following elements: 
1) Number of students (weighted by a cost coefficient for each area of study); 
2) Number of graduates (weighted); 
3) Number of Ph.D. students and graduates (not weighted); 
4) Education and professional structure of teachers; 
5) Research publications (weighted by category coefficients which represent quality and 
importance); 
6) Number of domestic and foreign research grants.  
Furthermore, changing the rules governing higher education management, HEIs may now 
efficiently and effectively utilise their tangible and intangible assets. Particularly, after 2002 
HEIs can: 
1) Keep their own revenues; 
                                                             
1 Incremental budgeting, as described by Layzell (1998), is done by considering an institution’s base budget of 
the prior year and allocates increases or decreases to that statement according to a set of budget guidelines. 
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2) Own their assets and employ them freely to generate revenues; 
3) Receive subsidies from government in an unstructured grant; 
4) Carry over to the following years any unspent funds.  
Lastly, HEIs introduced more long-term, strategic and sustainable management techniques by 
switching to accrual accounting and converting capital grants into regular subsidies. 
Higher education and research systems have a limited ability to rapidly respond to these 
changing incentives because of the length in these processes. In fact, students can be accepted 
immediately, papers can be written and grants can be submitted but it takes from one to three 
years before results are seen. Moreover, tangible assets, such as equipment and buildings, take 
years to build, and new teachers and staff need several years to be trained.  
The Act specifies that financial support to public HEIs is granted from the State budget in the 
form of four subsidies: 
1) Subsidy for running accredited study programmes: the allocation is done considering 
the number of students and graduates, the economic demand of the programme, the 
classification of the HEI and the quality of the teaching.  
2) Subsidy for research, development or artistic activities: the amount is decided on the 
basis of the capacity of the public HEI, on its achieved results and on the evaluation of 
its creative activities performed by the Accreditation Commission.  
3) Subsidy for the development of HEIs: it is established through the selection procedure 
of development programmes carried out by the Ministry. The procedure considers the 
quality of the projects and the long-term strategy of both the institution and the 
Ministry.  
4) Subsidy for student’s social support: it is based on students’ eligibility and on the 
availability of funds.  
The allocation of these subsidies is carried out referring to the guide which is annually 
updated by the Ministry. The guide is then mandatorily submitted to the representative bodies 
of HEIs in order to obtain their opinions.  
Figure 3.1 shows that the new system successfully increased the number of full-time students. 
In fact, after 2002 there is a surge in the number of full-time students with the only exception 
in the year 2004 where the curve slightly declined due to reasons not related to the reform2. 
The number of part-time students follows an upward trend since the year 2000 and 
                                                             
2 In 2004 the size of the class graduating from secondary education was small because four years before primary 
and lower secondary education shifted from eight to nine years, thus creating this small gap in the population.  
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enrollments surge starting from the year 2003. It is only in 2008 that part-time student 
numbers drop. Therefore, the reform did not succeed in shifting students from the part-time 
fee-paying system to the full-time system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The formula for payments to Ph.D. students consider the costs of the different fields of study. 
They are divided into three categories: medicine; natural, agricultural and technical sciences; 
and others. Furthermore, there are additional bonus payments for all students and graduates. 
These prices fluctuate considerably over the years, but there remains a significant premium 
between payments for Ph.D. students compared to payments for undergraduate and graduate 
students. Its objective was to raise the number of Ph.D. researchers. Figure 3.2 clearly shows 
the increase in Ph.D. enrolments starting from the year 2002. From 2003 to 2008, students 
almost doubled, with the exception of the year 2006. Therefore, we can definitely state that 
the reform succeeded in this respect.  
Furthermore, the funding formula considers the number of research grants received from 
Slovakian sources and from abroad. The only eligible Slovakian grants come from official 
government agencies. Instead, now international grants are obtained from National Institutes 
of Health in the US, the European Science Foundation, and the EU Framework Research 
Programme. Figure 3.3 shows the increase in foreign grants after 2005. The jump is due to a 
structural break in the data because the ministry relaxed eligibility conditions in that year. In 
Figure 3.1: Evolution of student 
numbers 
Figure 3.2: Developments in full-time PhD 
student numbers 
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contrast, the evolution of domestic grants accelerated after 2003. Outputs increased by almost 
800 percent and were ten times more than foreign grants3  
 
 
Government’s policy was to reduce the number of teachers without a Ph.D. and therefore 
improve the qualification of staff. To do so, the reform included a coefficient of qualification 
structure of teachers into the funding formula. Slovakia has a regular career ladder: teachers’ 
qualifications go from lecturer to senior lecturer and from associate professor to professor. 
Associate and full professors must meet nationally determined criteria while the appointment 
process is carried out by the institution. Figure 3.4 shows that the academic staff’s 
qualifications have increased after 2003: the number of teachers without a Ph.D. fell in 2005, 
while the number of full professors kept an upwards trend after the reform.  
Furthermore, after the reform subsidies are assigned from the State budget to public higher 
education institutions according to six allocation criteria: 
1) Historical principle, 
2) Performance in education, 
3) Performance in research, 
4) Specificities, 
5) Project quality, 
6) Other criteria. 
                                                             
3 Numbers from 2001 to 2006 are based on the volume of grants over the preceding two years, therefore the 2007 
and 2008 numbers are doubled to allow comparison. 
Figure 3.3: Eligible research grants in 
Sk1000 
Figure 3.4: Number of teachers in 
individual categories 
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Figure 3.5 shows the percentage rates of the four subsidies in the approved budget for 2003. 
As obvious from the figure, the subsidy for running accredited institutions has the biggest 
portion. It covers costs sustained by universities for the provision of higher education. 
Specifically, this subsidy covers costs for students, employees, operational costs and costs for 
specificities.  
Furthermore, from 2002 to 2006 the weight criteria for performance in research and project 
quality strengthened, suggesting that greater volumes of subsidies were allocated according to 
the number of successful Ph.D. researchers and to the importance of projects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2  Data 
The aim of this work is to estimate the effect of the Slovakian Higher Education Act on 
market income inequalities using a synthetic control approach. The model uses annual 
country-level panel data for the period going from 1995 to 2012. The Act reformed the 
financing of public universities starting from the academic year 2002/2003. Therefore, 2003 is 
considered as being the treatment period giving 8 pre-intervention periods and 9 post-
intervention periods. The synthetic Slovak Republic includes 21 European countries: Austria, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey 
and the United Kingdom.  
Figure 3.5: Structure of allocation of subsidies in 2003 
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Based on the theory, a set of market inequality predictors are identified: human capital, 
government expenditure, unemployment, taxes, trade, services and participation to trade 
unions. Furthermore, the model controls for population in order to make the synthetic Slovak 
Republic reproduce at best the values of the country. This measure considers all residents 
regardless of citizenship or legal status and is estimated at midyear. Population data are taken 
from a variety of sources: the “United Nations Population Division. World Population 
Prospects”, “Census reports and other statistical publications from national statistical offices”, 
“Eurostat: Demographic Statistics”, “United Nations Statistical Division. Population and Vital 
Statistics Report”, ”U.S. Census Bureau: International Database”, and the “Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community: Statistics and Demography Programme”.  
 
3.2.1  Dependent Variable 
The outcome variable is market income inequality in the Slovak Republic. Market inequality 
measures the distribution of income before taxes and transfers. In this work, inequality is 
estimated using the market Gini coefficient retrieved from the “The Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database” constructed by Solt (2016). The Database provides comparable 
data on income inequality covering a wide number of countries and years. Estimates of the 
market Gini index are available in Stata format. In order to capture uncertainty in the estimate, 
data are represented by 100 separate variables and are summarized to conduct the analysis. 
Figure 3.6 shows the trend in the market Gini coefficient in Slovakia from 1995 to 2012. The 
graph clearly shows that inequality plummeted after 2002. The objective of this work is to 
demonstrate that the Higher Education Act contributed to this drop using a synthetic control 
approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Trend of the market Gini 
coefficient in the Slovak Republic 
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3.2.2  Independent Variables 
Education is essential in reducing income inequality. Educated individuals will have larger 
occupational choices and will be more competitive in the labour market. By consequence, 
their level of pay will be higher acting as a signal of their ability and productivity in the 
market. Empirical studies show that increases in average educational attainment appear to be 
one of the most important factor contributing to the reduction in wage dispersion (Afonso et 
al., 2010; OECD, 2011; Checchi and Van de Werfhorst, 2014; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). In 
this analysis education is measured using the human capital index from the “Penn World 
Table - international comparisons of production, income and prices 9.0” constructed by the 
University of Groningen. In order to avoid problems of reverse causality, the measure is kept 
fixed at 1995 levels for all countries. The Penn World Table contain real national accounts 
data in U.S. dollars and are useful for research on development and growth. The human 
capital index is intended per person and is based both on years of schooling and on returns to 
education.  
Public spending has an impact on income inequality. It can directly affect the distribution of 
income by transferring resources to individuals that are worse-off. Redistributing to the poor 
may allow parents to pay for their children’s education, enabling them to afford better schools 
(Afonso et al., 2010). Generally, empirical studies using government spending as a proxy for 
redistributive policies, show that increases in such expenditures are associated with a 
decreases in income inequality (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). However, political economy 
literature suggests that governments redistribute when societies are unequal, proposing a 
positive relation between inequality and redistribution. This explanation derives from Meltzer 
and Richard’s (1981) theory on median voter preferences, according to which when the 
income gap between the median and mean voter is large, the median voter will require 
government’s intervention (De Mello and Tiongson, 2006). Furthermore, evidence shows that 
government spending seems to be neutral for the top income groups, while it has a negative 
effect on the middle and lower income groups (Roine et al., 2009). In this work general 
government consumption is measured as a share of GDP. It includes all government’s current 
expenditures for goods and services, and most of government’s investments on national 
defence and security. Data are obtained from the “World Bank national accounts data” and 
from the “OECD National Accounts data files”.  
Unemployment positively affects inequality. Increases in unemployment aggravate the 
position of low-income families because workers at the basis of the income distribution are 
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less educated and more at risk during economic recessions (Rodriguez-Pose and Tselios, 
2008). In order to consider this effect, this model uses national estimates of total 
unemployment as a percentage of total labour force. It refers to the share of workers without a 
job and actively seeking for an employment. The data is collected from the International 
Labour Organization, specifically from the “Key Indicators of the Labour Market database”.  
Reforming tax policies yields significant redistributive effects. During recessions, low-income 
groups experience losses emphasizing the need for government income-support policies 
(OECD, 2011). In his speech on “The Rise and Consequences of Inequality in the United 
States”, Krueger (2012) highlights the important role of tax policies. Tax changes benefitting 
the very rich more than taxpayers will aggravate the widening gap in pre-tax income. 
Evidence shows that economies do not perform better after cutting tax rates of the very 
wealthy, rather there are jobs increases across businesses when taxes are stricter on top 
earners. According to the American economist, differences between before-tax income 
inequality and after-tax income inequality measures the extent to which the tax system 
reduces inequality. Therefore, in order to construct this measure of tax, data are taken from 
“The Standardized World Income Inequality Database”.  
High trade and financial openness between countries enabled technological advances. But 
globalization has mixed effects. In advanced economies, firms adopt labour-saving 
technologies and offshoring techniques leading to the decline in manufacturing and increases 
in skill premium. The rise in skill premium makes non-educated workers worse off and 
society more unequal. On the other hand, trade openness and technological advances could 
raise the demand of less educated workers, increasing their wages and lowering income 
inequality (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). In OECD countries, globalization has been considered 
as the main cause of increasing income inequalities. Evidence suggests that trade integration 
rises the gap between wages of the high and low skilled and, therefore, contributes to greater 
income inequality (OECD, 2011). In the model trade is the sum of imports and exports of 
goods and services measured as a share of GDP. Data are collected from the “World Bank 
national accounts data” and the “OECD National Accounts data files”. 
Controlling for sectoral composition yields different results. Empirical evidence shows that 
agriculture, industry and services negatively affect income inequality. Nevertheless, 
decomposing services into finance, trade and public administration yields various results 
(Rodriguez-Pose and Tselios, 2008). Motonishi (2006) investigate the ambiguous effect of 
financial services on income inequality. More developed financial services allow the poor to 
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borrow from the wealthy, reducing income inequality. However, due to credit constraints, 
financial services are usually not available to the poor. Hence, these market failures increase 
income inequality. To avoid problems of multi-collinearity, the model uses only the services 
sector as a proxy of this determinant. Services are measured in terms of value added and are 
computed as a percentage of GDP. They correspond to divisions 50 to 99 of the “International 
Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities” (ISIC), including activities 
such as transports, government and personal services. This variable is also retrieved from the 
“World Bank national accounts data” and from the “OECD National Accounts data files”. 
A drop in trade union membership may reduce the bargaining power of labour. Lower union 
density may weaken workers’ influence on corporate decisions regarding compensations of 
top managers. Therefore, income inequality rises because de-unionization may increase the 
income share of the very rich and weaken earnings of middle and low-income workers 
(Jaumotte at al., 2015). In order to build a measure of participation to trade unions, this work 
uses an indicator which is built weighting the active trade union members on the number of 
employed individuals. Data on union members are collected from the “OECD Labour Force 
Statistics”, while employment numbers are taken from “The International Financial Statistics” 
of the IMF.  
 
Table 3.1: Data Description 
Variable Data Source Expected Effect 
 
  
Human Capital The Standardized World Income Inequality Database - 
Government 
Expenditure 
World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
+/- 
Unemployment International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the 
Labour Market database. 
+ 
Taxes The Standardized World Income Inequality Database. + 
Trade World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
+/- 
Services World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
+/- 
Trade Union 
Participation 
OECD Labour Force Statistics and the International 
Financial Statistics  
- 
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3.2.3  Descriptive Statistics 
This analysis estimates the effect of the Higher Education Act on income inequality. The 
regression model uses market income inequality as the dependent variable and a set of 
estimates which capture the effect of education, labour market, government policies and 
sectoral composition as the independent variables. The dataset contains 396 observations from 
22 countries for the period between 1995 and 2012. The summary statistics are reported in 
Table 3.2.  
The mean Gini market coefficient is 46% and has a standard deviation of 4%. Differently, 
trade has a mean of 87% and a standard deviation of 36%. This measure has the largest gap 
between the minimum and maximum value, it goes from 37% to 197%.  
Furthermore, the table shows a wide gap between the minimum and the maximum value of 
participation to trade unions. Countries experience different patterns. In fact, values go from 
4% to 75% of participation. Due to globalization, union density declined in most advanced 
economies after 1995 (OECD, 2012). Globalization increases competition, improves 
education levels and reduces workers’ incentives to enter unions. However, Nordic European 
countries continue to have high participation levels to trade unions (Jaumotte et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, taxes have a negative minimum value. This is due to income inequality in 
Estonia. The country has a slightly larger net Gini coefficient than market Gini in 1995 and 
1996. These values suggest that the government was able to largely redistribute to its 
population, and reduce inequality after taxes and transfers.  
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Gini Market 396 46.524 3.975 35.127 56.300 
Human Capital 95 396 2.961 0.409 1.854 3.498 
Government Expenditure 396 19.500 3.469 10.177 28.064 
Unemployment 396 8.378 4.081 2.100 24.800 
Taxes 396 17.337 5.080 -0.441 26.890 
Trade 396 87.347 35.981 37.108 197.218 
Services 396 67.286 5.898 50.474 81.079 
Trade Union Participation 396 27.117 18.262 4.526 75.327 
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3.3  Linear Regressions 
In this work, we will estimate the model first using panel data estimation techniques and then 
adopting the synthetic control method. The empirical model to analyse the impact of the 
Higher Education Act on market income inequality is based on the following regression: 
 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑐95𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(3.1) 
for country i (i = 1,…, J+1) at time t (t = 1,…, T). Hc95 is the stock of human capital in 1995, 
GovExp is the total amount of government expenditure as a share of GDP, Unem is the 
unemployment rate, Tax is the measure of taxes, Trade is the sum of imports and exports of 
goods and services measured as a share of GDP, Services is the value added of services as a 
percentage of GDP, Unions is the share of active trade union members on the number of 
employed individuals, Pop measures population, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term.  
Hausman (1978) presents a specification test for measuring whether the regressors are 
uncorrelated to the disturbance term. Under the null hypothesis, there is no misspecification 
and there exists a consistent and asymptotically normal and efficient estimator. Under the 
alternative hypothesis, there is misspecification and the previous estimator will be biased and 
inconsistent. Thus, there must exist an alternative estimator which is consistent under the null 
and alternative hypothesis, but not asymptotically efficient under the null.  
This test may be used to identify the best estimator between random effects and fixed effects. 
The test measures whether 𝐸(𝜇𝑖|𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 0, which is a crucial assumption for the random 
effects model. Thus, in this instance, under the null hypothesis ?̂?𝐺𝐿𝑆 and ?̂?𝐹𝐸 are both 
consistent estimators, but the latter is not efficient. If the assumption is violated, we reject the 
null hypothesis and random effect is inconsistent while fixed effects is the consistent and 
preferred estimator.  
Furthermore, the null hypothesis can be tested by measuring the difference between the two 
estimators given by the following equation: 
 ?̂? = ?̂?𝐹𝐸 − ?̂?𝐺𝐿𝑆 (3.2) 
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If there is no misspecification the variable ?̂? should be near zero, then ?̂?𝐹𝐸 and ?̂?𝐺𝐿𝑆 should be 
approximately the same. In this case, we accept the null hypothesis that no misspecifications 
exist and, therefore, the random effects estimator is correct.  
Moreover, under the null hypothesis the test measures whether the covariance of the efficient 
estimator and its difference from the inefficient estimator is zero using the following matrix 
algebra formula:  
 (𝛽𝑅𝐸 − 𝛽𝐹𝐸)
′Σ̂−1(𝛽𝑅𝐸 − 𝛽𝐹𝐸)~𝜒
2(𝑘) (3.3) 
The Hausman test statistic is distributed as 𝜒2 with k degrees of freedom, indicating the 
number of endogenous variables. If this measure is significant, then the random effects 
estimator should not be used. 
This analysis first evaluates the empirical model using ordinary least squares, random effects 
and fixed effects. Then the Hausman specification test will be discussed, suggesting which of 
these techniques yields the best estimations.  
 
3.4  The Synthetic Control Method 
The Synthetic Control Method was initially explained by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) in 
their study on the economic effects of conflicts. The article focuses on the Basque ETA 
terrorist organization, which began in the late 1960’s, and assesses its impact on the regional 
economy. Results show that after this period, GDP per capita in the Basque region decreased 
by about 10 percent compared to its synthetic control region without terrorism. Then, this 
methodology is used by Abadie et al. (2010) for comparative case studies. The authors study 
the effects of the tobacco control program, known as Proposition 99, which has been 
implemented by California in 1988. With the use of the Synthetic Control Method, they were 
able to recreate a synthetic California in absence of the program and analyse the trend of 
tobacco consumption in this region. Results reveal that in the year 2000, yearly per-capita 
cigarette sales in California had decreased by about 26 packs compared to its synthetic control 
region.  
This approach constructs a weighted combination of the outcome’s predictors, representing 
what would have occurred in the absence of the statute. In contrast to the Difference-in-
differences (DiD) approach, the synthetic control method admits changes over time in the 
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observed and unobserved effects of the predictors. In fact, DiD estimations assume that time 
effects, as macro shocks, are common to all treated groups. In this way, it removes the 
confounding factors in the unobserved covariates, which are due to fixed differences between 
the groups, by assuming that they do not change over time. These two assumptions are 
referred to as “parallel trends assumption”, implying that the trajectories of the treated and 
control groups follow a parallel trend over time (Kreif et al., 2016).  
The methodology adopted firstly by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) is used to investigate the 
effects of the Higher Education Act on market income inequalities in the Slovak Republic. 
This approach aims at measuring the effect of the reform on post-intervention outcomes, 
examining the trend of the market Gini in the absence of the reform. In order to do so, it is 
important to build a counterfactual which approximates the values of the predictors of the 
market Gini before the reform. Next, the synthetic control method is described following 
Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie et. al (2015).  
Suppose that there are J+1 countries indexed by j, where the treated unit is j = 1 and units j = 
2 to j = J+1 are countries used as controls, the “donor pool”. Market inequality in donor 
countries is considered as being driven by the identical structural process of that in Slovakia, 
and must not be subject to structural shocks during the sample period. This method uses 
longitudinal data sets observing all units from t = 1 to t = T. There are a positive number of 
pre-intervention periods, denoted as T0, and a positive number of post-intervention periods 
indicated as T1. Therefore, T = T0 + T1. Then, the synthetic control is a weighted average of 
the j countries in the donor pool, where all the weights sum to 1. In other terms, for j = 2, …, 
J weights w2 + … + wJ+1 = 1 and it can be represented by a (J x 1) vector of weights W = (w2, 
…, wJ+1)’, where 0 ≤ wj ≤ 1. The outcome observed in the absence of the intervention for 
country i at time t is the market Gini coefficient and it is denoted by 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁. Then, the outcome 
observed if country i is exposed to the intervention at time T = T0 + 1 is indicated by 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐼 . 
Therefore, the outcome observed in country i at time t is given by the following formula: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑡 (3.4) 
where the causal effect of the treatment is given by: 
 𝛼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐼 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 (3.5) 
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As in Average Treatment Effects, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 0 in all countries up to time T0 and from time t = T0 + 
1 to T in the donor pool countries.  Then, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1 for the Slovak Republic from period T0 + 1 
onwards. 
Differently from the DiD approach, the synthetic control model admits region-specific trends. 
Thus, the counterfactual outcome is given by the following regression:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 = 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡𝑍𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3.6) 
where 𝛿𝑡, 𝜃𝑡 and 𝜆𝑡 are unknown time-specific parameters, while 𝑍𝑖 and 𝜇𝑖 are respectively 
observed and unobserved country-specific characteristics.  
Following the Method of Differences, the value of W is chosen such that the characteristics of 
the donor pool best resemble the features of Slovakia. X1 is the (k x 1) vector including the 
pre-intervention values of the market Gini predictors for the treated country, while X0 is the k 
x J-matrix containing the same values for the donor pool. Thus, the vector X1 – X0 W 
represents the difference between the pre-intervention characteristics of Slovakia and its 
synthetic control, which is chosen using the vector W* which minimizes this difference. 
Defining X1m as the vector containing the values of the m-th predictor for the treated unit and 
X0m as the (1 x J) vector containing the same values for the donor pool, W* is chosen as to 
minimize:  
 
∑ 𝑣𝑚(𝑋1𝑚 − 𝑋𝑜𝑚𝑊)
2
𝑘
𝑚=1
 (3.7) 
where vm is a weight representing the relative importance assigned to each predictor and m = 
1, …, k. Furthermore, weights are chosen such that the synthetic control minimizes the pre-
treatment “Root Mean Squared Prediction Error” (RMSPE). This index measures the lack of 
fit between the trend in the Gini market for Slovakia and its synthetic control. It is defined by 
the following formula: 
 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑃𝐸 = (
1
𝑇0
∑ (𝑌1𝑡 − ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
)
𝑇0
𝑡=1
2
)
1 2⁄
 (3.8) 
The outcome of unit j at time t is denoted as Yjt. Therefore, Y1 is the (T1 x 1) vector containing 
the post-intervention values of the market Gini for Slovakia, and Y0 is the (T1 x J) matrix 
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containing the outcome values for the countries in the donor pool. The effect of the treatment, 
estimated using the synthetic control, is given by comparing post-intervention outcomes of 
the treated and not treated countries. It is given by the following equation:  
 
?̂?1𝑡 = 𝑌1𝑡 − ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
 (3.9) 
Thus, even if the trend is country-specific, in the pre-intervention period the synthetic control 
displays the same trend of the treated unit if weights have been correctly chosen. Galiani and 
Quistorff (2016) state that, in this case, the bias in ?̂?1𝑡 decreases to zero with the increase in 
the number of pre-intervention periods.   
Furthermore, the synthetic control providing a good fit for the treated country may still have a 
large interpolation bias if the linear model does not hold over the whole set of control units. In 
order to minimize biases, researchers restrict the donor pool to countries with characteristics 
which are similar to the treated one. In such a way, biases caused by interpolation are 
minimized (Abadie et at., 2010). In this analysis Slovakia is the treated unit, therefore we 
have tried to reduce interpolation bias by including other European countries in the donor 
pool.  
Moreover, Abadie et al. (2015) compare the synthetic control method to regressions. Similar 
to a regression-based approach, the linear combination of the untreated countries is 
constructed using coefficients that sum to one. However, regression weights may assume 
values greater than one or negative values. Therefore, estimating counterfactuals using linear 
regressions allows the regression weights to produce a perfect fit by extrapolating even if the 
characteristics of the treated unit cannot be replicated using a weighted average of the 
countries in the donor pool. Then, regression weights are not actually calculated, therefore 
analysts usually do not know to what extent regression techniques extrapolate. In contrast to 
this approach, coefficients of the synthetic control method must be between zero and one, 
therefore, the comparison group is constructed avoiding extrapolation. 
Billmeier and Nannicini (2013) discuss the advantages and limitations of this methodology. 
Clearly, the main advantage is that the synthetic control allows an estimation of the 
counterfactual outcome for the treated country. The algorithm uses the chosen predictors to 
construct a weighted average of the outcome variable. Thus, one of its evident advantages is 
transparency because the synth command shows the weights assigned to each country and 
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allows us to understand which units are included in the synthetic control. Then, the 
identification assumptions of this method are weaker than those demanded by other 
commonly used estimators. In fact, endogeneity from omitted variable bias is solved by 
considering time-varying unobservable confounders. This aspect improves the DiD model 
discussed above. Moreover, a major limitation is that reforms might be motivated by future 
growth prospect beliefs, thus causing endogeneity problems from reverse causality and 
biasing the findings of the method. However, this approach does not provide large sample 
inferential techniques to assess the significance of the results. In fact, in this work inferences 
are made using the synth runner command in Stata.  
 
3.5  The synth runner Package 
This inferential technique is explained following Galiani and Quistorff (2016).  The statistical 
significance of the results is assessed by running multiple synthetic control estimations. The 
program runs “in-place” placebo tests which assign the treatment to each unit in the donor 
pool and checks the size of these effects. Performing these evaluations, the Slovak Republic is 
excluded from the synthetic control group. In order to have statistically significant results, the 
distribution of placebo tests must not yield outcomes which are as large as those of the treated 
unit. Otherwise, we can state that the treatment effect has been observed by chance.  
Furthermore, p-values are provided by comparing the estimated treatment effect to the 
distribution of the in-place placebo effects, which is defined as ?̂?1𝑡
𝑃𝐿 =  {?̂?𝑗𝑡 ∶ 𝑗 ≠ 1}. 
Recalling that the treatment effect for the Slovakia is denoted as ?̂?1𝑡, the two-sided p-value 
can be formalized using the following formula: 
 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = Pr (|?̂?1𝑡
𝑃𝐿| ≥ |?̂?1𝑡|) 
                           =
∑ 1(|?̂?𝑗𝑡| ≥ |?̂?1𝑡|)𝑗≠1
𝐽
 
(3.10) 
This is classical randomization inference when treatment is randomly assigned. However, 
when treatment is not randomized the p-value is interpreted as being the share of control 
countries having estimated effects at least as large as Slovakia. Abadie et al. (2010) suggest 
measuring the treatment effects by comparing post-treatment RMSPE of the treated country to 
those estimated when the intervention is assigned to a unit in the donor pool. Thus, if the unit 
is not matched well placebo effects will be rather large and p-values will be too conservative. 
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In order to control for this, we can adjust the treatment effect and the post-treatment RMSPE 
to the quality of the match in the pre-treatment period. This is done by dividing the causal 
effects by their corresponding pre-treatment RMSPE which gives the “pseudo t-statistic” 
measure.  
Moreover, the package yields effects graphs and p-value graphs which enable us to capture 
the significance of the results. Cavallo et al. (2013) suggest visually comparing the synthetic 
control to the counterfactual in order to check the goodness of fit. The weighted average of 
donors approximates Slovakia in the pre-treatment period if the treated unit belongs to the 
convex hull of the control countries. Furthermore, this program enables researchers to use 
cross-validation techniques to find the optimal weights. The pre-treatment period is divided 
into two sections: the first one is defined as the “training” period and the latter is denominated 
the “validation” period. Abadie et al (2015) use this procedure and denote the period from 
1971 to 1980 as the training period and the one from 1981 to 1990 as the validation period. 
Then, they use the predictors of the training period to find the weights of the resulting 
synthetic control that minimize the RMSPE over the validation period.  
Inference is performed both imposing the trend and without imposing the trend. Trends force 
the program to match the outcome variable by scaling the market Gini of each unit and 
making it equal to 1 at the end of the pre-treatment period (Galiani and Quistorff, 2016).  
Therefore, the synth runner is a valuable tool for researchers because it allows them to 
estimate the common tasks of the synthetic control model. In fact, the methodology explained 
by Galiani and Quistorff (2016) automates the process of running-in-place placebos and 
measuring inference. Specifically, Cavallo et al. (2013) state that this tool allows the initial 
estimation to be extended and enable multiple units to receive treatment. Then, it matches 
trends on the outcome variable and automates the splitting of the pre-treatment period into 
“training” and “validation” periods.  
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CHAPTER 4 – EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
4.1  Traditional Panel Regressions 
The results of the panel regression, estimated using ordinary least squares, fixed effects and 
random effects are discussed in this section. Then are presented the conclusions of the 
Hausman test statistic.  
Table 4.1 shows the outcomes of the econometric model given by the three estimation 
techniques. They are based on 396 annual observations from 1995 to 2012 on 22 countries. It 
is evident that results are widely in line with the literature. In all three specifications, the 
majority of the determinants of market inequality are significant at 1% level. However, trade 
is not statistically significant. Countries in the sample belong to middle or high-income 
groups, besides their classification varies throughout the years. This suggests that trade is not 
significant because countries in the sample have different levels of development and, 
therefore, this variable impacts market inequality in different ways depending on the 
classification of economies. This problem could be solved by dividing the countries according 
to their level of income and running separate regressions.  
Estimating the regression with ordinary least squares yields the expected positive effect for 
unemployment and taxes, meaning that increases in these variables cause market inequality to 
rise. Then, increases in the level of education of the population and in trade union enrolments 
decrease market inequality. The interpretation of the coefficient of human capital in 1995 is 
that a 0.01 unit increase in the Penn World Table indicator reduces market inequality by 4 
Gini points. This can be explained looking at the values in the summary statistic. In fact, the 
predictor goes from a minimum of 1.854 to a maximum of 3.498, and it hardly varies by more 
than one-hundredth from one year to the other. Next, a 10 percent increase in government 
spending decreases market inequality by 2.45 Gini points. This result supports the theory 
stating that public spending may help the poor to afford better schools and, hence, reduces 
income inequalities (Afonso et al., 2010; Dabla-Norris et. al, 2015). Using OLS estimation 
techniques, services are positively correlated with market inequality. Specifically, a 10 
percent increase in the share of services on GDP makes the market Gini rise by 1.1 percentage 
points. This is due to the different sub-sectors included in this category, which have various 
impacts on the market Gini. Furthermore, since the variables impact income inequality both 
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positively and negatively, inequality would exist even if all the predictors were close to zero. 
Thus, the constant is statistically significant at 1 percent level.   
Next, the regression is estimated using random effects. In this instance, the table shows 
government expenditure, unemployment and taxes have a positive effect on market income 
inequality; while human capital in 1995, trade, services and participation in trade unions yield 
reductions in the market Gini. Specifically, a 0.01 unit increase in the index of education 
reduces inequality by about 6 Gini points. The positive coefficient for public spending 
suggests that a 10 percent increase in this variable increases market inequality by 1.5 
percentage points. This confirms Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) hypothesis on median voter 
preferences. Contrarily to OLS, in this model, a 10 percent increase in the services sector as a 
share of GDP reduces the Gini market by 1.4 percentage points. This result is in line with the 
majority of the literature suggesting that agriculture, industry, and services negatively affect 
income inequality. Moreover, taxes play an important role in income inequality. A 1 percent 
increase in taxes yields a 0.844 percent rise in the market Gini.  
The third column of table 4.1 estimates the regression using fixed effects. This specification 
gives the highest coefficient of determination stating that 81 percent of the variation in the 
market Gini is explained by the variation in the chosen predictors. In this instance, human 
capital in 1995 is excluded from the model because fixed effects remove any time-invariant 
factors. Differently from the previous two estimations, services have a negative and not 
statistically significant effect on market inequality. Furthermore, services and participation in 
trade unions are the only two determinants that negatively affect the Gini coefficient. Similar 
to random effects, a 10 percent increase in government spending rises market inequality by 
2.1 Gini points.  
Then, in order to understand which of these estimation techniques is the best for this analysis, 
we run the Hausman test. First of all, the exogeneity test is done for OLS and RE. The null 
hypothesis is that the unobserved effects are exogenous and therefore, the two estimations are 
equivalent. In this case, the appropriate estimator would be OLS. The test statistic rejects the 
null hypothesis. It is statistically significant at 1 percent level, and it yields a χ2 (8) = 83.20 
and a p-value = 0.000. This means that random effect is the consistent estimator. Next, the 
Hausman test for FE and OLS is calculated. The null hypothesis is that OLS is the consistent 
and efficient estimator. Results show a χ2 (8) = 176.89 and a p-value = 0.000. In words, the 
null hypothesis is rejected, meaning that the two estimators are not asymptotically equivalent 
and that FE is the preferred estimator. Lastly, the Hausman test for FE and RE reveals that the 
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FE is the consistent estimator. The test statistic has a χ2 (8) = 511.15 and a p-value = 0.000, 
suggesting these two estimation techniques are largely different from one another.  
 
Table 4.1: Regression results of the Gini market inequality coefficient 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Variables 
  
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Random Effects Fixed Effects 
          
Human Capital 95  -4.750*** -6.014***  
  (0.385) (1.455)  
Government 
Expenditure 
 
-0.245*** 
(0.051) 
0.153** 
(0.060) 
0.206*** 
(0.059) 
Unemployment 
 
0.126*** 0.098*** 0.078*** 
  
(0.032) (0.025) (0.023) 
Taxes 
 
0.724*** 0.844*** 0.829*** 
  
(0.038) (0.029) (0.028) 
Trade 
 
0.007 -0.001 0.002 
  
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Services 
 
0.113*** -0.140*** -0.048 
  
(0.023) (0.036) (0.040) 
Trade Union 
Participation 
 
-0.027*** 
(0.01) 
-0.082*** 
(0.017) 
-0.065*** 
(0.018) 
Population 
 
0.041*** -0.018 -0.350*** 
  
(0.007) (0.022) (0.052) 
Constant 
 
43.269*** 58.040*** 40.645*** 
  
(1.875) (4.569) (1.877) 
  
   
No. of Obs 
 
396 396 396 
No. of Countries 
 
22 22 22 
R-squared 
 
0.670 0.441 0.810 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
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4.2  The Synthetic Control Method 
In this section, we present and discuss the impact of the Higher Education Act on market 
income inequality in Slovakia estimated using the synthetic control method. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, one of the main advantages of this approach is transparency, because the 
command yields a table showing the weights assigned to each country in the donor pool. 
These controls are chosen by looking at the values of predictors which best reproduce the 
estimators of the treated unit during the pre-intervention period. The effect of the Slovakian 
Higher Education Act on market income inequality is estimated as the difference between the 
market Gini in Slovakia and its synthetic version in the years after the reform. The 
implementation of this experiment is reported both numerically and graphically.  
Table 4.2 shows the weights assigned by the algorithm to each control country. The weights 
are assigned considering the combination of countries that best determine the market Gini 
coefficient of Slovakia before the reform. Furthermore, this value is chosen as to minimize the 
pre-treatment RMSPE of the market Gini coefficient. Thus, the trend of the outcome variable 
in Slovakia before the reform is reproduced at best by merging four countries: the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, and Germany. Finland receives the highest weight, thus 
suggesting it is the country whose predictors best resemble Slovakia before the intervention. 
Differently, Germany is included in the synthetic control with a 0.005 unit weight, meaning 
that among the four countries, its variables resemble the least the Slovak Republic. All other 
countries in the donor pool are given zero weights. By construction, the set of weights for the 
synthetic Slovakia sum to one and the methodology does not admit negative values, thus it 
avoids extrapolation.  
Table 4.2: Country weights in the synthetic Slovakia 
Country Unit Weight Country Unit Weight Country Unit Weight 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Austria 0 Greece 0 Portugal 0 
Czech Republic 0.228 Hungary 0 Slovenia 0 
Denmark 0 Ireland 0 Spain 0 
Estonia 0.176 Italy 0 Sweden 0 
Finland 0.591 Netherlands 0 Switzerland 0 
France 0 Norway 0 Turkey 0 
Germany 0.005 Poland 0 United Kingdom 0 
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Table 4.3 provides the values of the predictors of the market Gini in the pre-intervention 
period and compares the estimates of Slovakia to those of its synthetic control. In this way, 
the affinity between the treated unit and its synthetic counterpart is proven and it avoids 
“extreme counterfactuals” as those that fall far away from the data’s convex hull (King and 
Zeng, 2006). Looking at these pre-treatment characteristics it is evident that the synthetic 
Slovakia is extremely similar to the actual one in terms of government expenditure and taxes. 
Differently, the data on trade and participation to trade unions assume different values in 
Europe. This is due to the existing differences among the economies and to the diverse 
importance assigned to trade unions. Therefore, on average these two predictors do not 
perfectly match the values of Slovakia. Furthermore, unemployment and human capital 
predictors are quite close to the country’s estimates. This non-perfect fit may be due to the 
different levels of economic development experienced by the countries during the 1995 – 
2012 period.  
       Table 4.3: Market Gini predictor means 
Predictors Slovakia 
Synthetic 
Slovakia  
   Human Capital 95 3.224 3.120 
Government Expenditure 20.330 20.592 
Unemployment 15.200 11.112 
Taxes 19.691 19.518 
Trade 113.224 85.351 
Services 59.606 61.786 
Trade Union Participation 35.557 48.296 
Population 5.381 6.047 
Figure 4.1 displays the market Gini coefficient for the Slovak Republic and for its synthetic 
control during the period between 1995 and 2012. The measure of market income inequality 
in the synthetic Slovakia closely tracks the trajectory of the variable in Slovakia for the entire 
pre-treatment period. Thus, given that the line of the Slovak Republic falls within the convex 
hull of the control units, we can state the synthetic counterpart is a good fit for the country. 
Therefore, the four countries provide a sensible approximation of market income inequality in 
Slovakia if the Higher Education Act had not been approved. The figure shows that after 
2002, the year of approval of the Act, the two lines clearly diverge. The market Gini in the 
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country peaked in that year. Next, the curve plummeted until 2007, when it then slightly 
increased and kept a quite steady trend until the end of the period. Differently, the curve of the 
counterfactual outcome fluctuates between 47 and 46 Gini points during the entire post-
intervention period. Looking at the divergence between the two lines it is evident that the 
treatment effect increased over time. Specifically, the maximum gap is observed from 2007 
onwards, when the synthetic Slovakia differs from its counterfactual by about 4 Gini points, a 
decline of approximately 9%. Therefore, we can clearly state that the educational reform 
successfully decreased market income inequality in the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3  Inference 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the synth runner package enables to run inference both 
imposing the trend and without imposing the trend. To evaluate the credibility of the results, 
statistical significance is estimated firstly without imposing the trend. Figure 4.1 clearly 
shows the match between Slovakia and its synthetic counterpart, and the gap in the market 
Gini after the approval of the Act. However, in order to ensure the treatment effect has not 
been generated by chance, it is important to conduct in-place placebo studies where the 
treatment is reassigned to a country different from Slovakia. If the placebo test yields a large 
Figure 4.1:  Trends in the market Gini coefficient: Slovakia vs 
synthetic Slovakia 
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treatment effect for the countries in the donor pool, our confidence that the decrease in market 
inequality is due to the passage of the Higher Education Act would be undermined. 
Furthermore, these results would indicate that the synthetic control lacks of predictive power.  
Figure 4.2 shows the gaps in the market Gini for the Slovak Republic and for countries that 
did not experience the treatment of interest. We will consider that the Higher Education Act 
generates a significant effect on the index of market income inequality in Slovakia if the 
effects graph reveals that, after the Act, the treated country has an unusually large downturn 
compared to the countries in the donor pool. The gray lines show the differences in the market 
Gini between each country in the donor pool and its synthetic counterpart, while the black line 
is the gap for Slovakia. Then, the red vertical line indicates the passage of the Higher 
Education Act. It is apparent from the figure, that the estimated gap in the market Gini 
coefficient for the Slovak Republic during the 1995 – 2012 period is remarkably large relative 
to the distribution of the gaps for the countries in the donor. This suggests that the decrease in 
market income inequality in Slovakia is definitely due to the passage of the Higher Education 
Act. If the market Gini gap in the country was not extreme compared to the gap experienced 
by the countries in the donor pool, then this would imply that the treatment effect was due to 
luck and not to the passage of the reform.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Market Gini gaps in Slovakia compared to the 
countries in the donor pool 
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Moreover, the synth command yields a pre-treatment RMSPE of 1.335. In fact, looking at the 
gap in the market Gini index during the pre-treatment period, it is clear that the Slovak 
Republic fluctuates around zero. Thus, this indicates that its synthetic control approximates 
well the values of the country. If the synthetic Slovakia did not fit market inequality in the 
real Slovakia during the pre-intervention period, then the post-intervention gap would be 
interpreted as being due to the lack of fit between the two countries and not to the approval of 
the Higher Education Act. 
However, some countries in the donor pool have significant pre-treatment gaps. This indicates 
that for some countries market inequality during the 1995-2012 period cannot be accurately 
reproduced by a convex combination of market inequality in other countries. Thus, placebo 
tests with poor fits could be excluded from this test because they do not provide information 
on the rarity of estimating a large post-intervention gap for a country that was well matched 
before the reform. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 displays precise inference for the obtained results. The horizontal axis indicates the 
number of periods after the event (leads) while the vertical axis specifies the standardized p-
values. The figure shows that the probability of observing the treatment effect by chance 
declines over the years. In fact, the pseudo t-statistic is high one year after the reform but it is 
equal to zero from leads 4 to 7. Next, the index slightly increases from lead 8 until the end of 
the period. Thus, on average the probability of observing a decline in the Gini coefficient by 
Figure 4.3: Pseudo t-statistics for Slovakia 
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chance is close to zero. This evidence confirms the theory that the reform causes a statistically 
significant decline in the market income inequality in the country.  
Furthermore, the treatment effect has been estimated forcing the synth to match trends in the 
outcome variable. Results lead to the same conclusions of the synthetic control estimation 
without imposing the trend which shows that Slovakia and its synthetic counterpart are well 
fitted and that the treatment effect is statistically significant.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The goal of this thesis has been to assess the impact of the Slovakian Higher Education Act 
on market income inequality. The synthetic control method uses data from four countries 
during the period between 1995 and 2012 and reveals that education finance reforms can 
decrease market income inequality.  
This work extends the existing empirical literature on education and income inequality by 
providing a program evaluation approach. The synthetic control method compares a treated 
country (Slovakia) with an estimated counterfactual (synthetic Slovakia). The synthetic 
country is a linear combination of units that are similar to Slovakia in the pre-treatment values 
of the outcome variable, and in the chosen predictors over the entire period. Predictors have 
been selected looking at the literature and at data availability. Hence, seven determinants of 
market income inequality have been recognized: education, government expenditure, 
unemployment, taxes, trade, services, and participation to trade unions. The main advantage 
of this methodology is that it allows unobserved differences to have time-variant effects, and 
therefore rejects the parallel trends assumption.  
The synth runner program is used to check the robustness of the results. In place, placebos are 
run by assigning the treatment status to each country in the donor pool. Results show that the 
gap between the pre-intervention and post-intervention market Gini of Slovakia is extremely 
large compared to the gap experienced by the control countries. Therefore, the synthetic 
Slovakia is a good fit for the country and the treatment effect is statistically significant.  
The empirical results are in line with the literature suggesting there is a causal effect between 
education and income inequality. These findings have considerable political economy 
implications. In fact, governments pursuing sustainable growth patterns should increase the 
amount of public spending allotted to education. Increasing educational resources will help 
low-income families escape the poverty trap and raise the share of educated workers. Thus, 
high skilled individuals benefit the society and have significant short-run and long-run 
implications.   
Moreover, due to data availability, the model analysis 21 countries from 1995 to 2012. 
Interesting further studies could re-estimate the synthetic control model including all 
European countries, countries from the former Soviet Union, and countries that belonged to 
the same income group of Slovakia during 2002.  
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